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The Right to Travel: Breaking
Down the Thousand Petty
Fortresses of State SelfDeportation Laws
R. Linus Chan*
Introduction
The vanishing began Wednesday night, the most
frightened families packing up their cars as soon
as they heard the news. They left behind mobile
homes, sold fully furnished for a thousand
dollars or even less. Or they just closed up and,
in a gesture of optimism, left the keys with a
neighbor. Dogs were fed one last time; if no home
could be found, they were simply unleashed.
Two, [five], [ten] years of living here, and then
gone in a matter of days, to Tennessee, Illinois,
Oregon, Florida, Arkansas, Mexico—who knows?
Anywhere but Alabama.1
This mass exodus from Albertville, Alabama was not the result
of a natural disaster or fears of an invasion by hostile forces.
Instead, the residents of Albertville fled Alabama exactly in the
manner the state legislators intended when Alabama passed
H.B. 56. As Alabama Senator Scott Beason explained,
[a]ll these bills are designed for people to say,
you know what, they’re going to try to enforce the
* Visiting Associate Professor of Clinical Law, University of Minnesota
Law School. I would like to thank David Rodriguez, Mark Noferi, Allison
Tirres, Anita Madalli, Hiroshi Motomura, and Matthew Lamkin, not only for
1. Campbell Robertson, After Ruling, Hispanics Flee an Alabama Town,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/after-rulinghispanics-flee-an-alabama-town.html.
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law here in this state. And maybe we need to
move back to our home country. Or maybe we
need to move to a state that has its arms wide
open for illegal aliens.2
Alabama’s H.B. 56 is part of a legislative strategy known
as “self-deportation”-a term first used to satirize an early
ancestor of H.B. 56 that was passed in California as a public
referendum titled, Proposition 187.3 The satirical term
transformed into public policy for states that were frustrated
by a perceived lack of federal enforcement of immigration laws.
The policy got national attention when Mitt Romney adopted
self-deportation as part of his platform during the 2012
Presidential election campaign.4 Despite a national discussion
on immigration generally, often self-deportation legislation
remains a local or state based issue. In June of 2013, the town
of Fremont, Nebraska successfully defended in the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals a set of ordinances written to prevent
undocumented immigrants from living in the city.5
Self-deportation legislation varies as to its provisions and
enforcement, but the central idea remains the same: control
and prevent migration of undocumented people6 into a state or
locality with discriminating treatment. Whether it is the City
of Hazleton, Pennsylvania outlawing the undocumented from
2. This American Life: Reap What You Sow, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Jan.
27,
2012),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/456/transcript.
3. See Robert Mackey, The Deep Comic Roots of ‘Self-Deportation,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/the-deepcomic-roots-of-self-deportation.
4. Julia Preston, Republican Immigration Platform Adopts ‘SelfDeportation,’
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
23,
2012,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/republican-immigrationplatform-backs-self-deportation.
5. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013).
6. This article will use the term “undocumented person” or
“undocumented migrant” to refer to those who have either entered into the
United States without inspection, or have continued to stay in the United
States after violating their immigration status. For the same reasons
articulated by the AP and other news organizations, the use of the term
“illegal immigrant” will not be employed.
See Paul Colford, ‘Illegal
(Apr.
2,
2013),
Immigrant’
No
More,
AP
BLOG
http://blog.ap.org/2013/04/02/illegal-immigrant-no-more/.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7

2

816

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

renting apartments, H.B. 56’s declaration that all contracts
entered into with undocumented people are unenforceable, or
Arizona’s prohibition on transportation of undocumented
people, the goal is to prevent the physical presence and
residence of any undocumented person within city or state
borders.7 The term “self-deportation” is not limited to the
removal of unwanted migrants currently residing in the state
or municipality, but also refers to the creation of a hostile
environment for undocumented migrants so as to deter them
from migrating into the state or municipality at all.8
In June of 2012, the Supreme Court struck a severe blow
against self-deportation laws when it ruled that existing
federal law pre-empted three out of the four provisions of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and that the fourth provision would survive
only if narrowly applied.9 In deciding the case, the Court never
directly addressed Arizona’s purpose in passing the law, which
was to expel the undocumented. Rather, the Supreme Court
sidestepped questions about whether the law was
discriminatory, unduly harsh, or violated a substantive
constitutional right of a person or a group of people.10 Despite
S.B. 1070’s overt discrimination and harsh treatment of a class
of people, the Court’s opinion only referred to sovereignties and
the balance of power between the federal and state
governments.
Pre-emption’s role in the S.B. 1070 litigation is
7. Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (“IIRAO”), Alabama Act
2011-535, and SB 1070 §5.
8. The architects of such policy viewed an enforcement heavy
environment essential to not only expel unwanted migrants but to also serve
as a deterrent for their migration. See Jessica M. Vaughan, Attrition
Through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink the Illegal
Population, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.cis.org/Enforcement-IllegalPopulation.
9. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (“Arizona
may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal
immigration while that process continues, but the State may not pursue
policies that undermine federal law.”).
10. See Justin Feldman, The Missing Racial Profiling Argument in the
(July
19,
2012),
Arizona
Case,
COUNTERPUNCH
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/07/19/the-missing-racial-profilingargument-in-the-arizona-case (The one provision of S.B. 1070 that
presumably survived would have been analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment, but the Court found the charge untimely.).
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unsurprising as it has been used to challenge state based
immigration regulation for more than a century.11 Even though
self-deportation legislation is often explicitly discriminatory
against a group of people, a focus on structural and federalism
values was used as the constitutional footing of the
undocumented continues to be unclear and their access to
constitutional protections limited. Surrogates such as
federalism, administrative competence and, in some cases, the
substantive rights of citizens in order to challenge state based
immigration laws has in the modern era proved to be more
effective than using traditional civil rights bulwarks such as
Equal Protection.12
The shift from a focus on discrimination and substantive
rights to ones focusing on pre-emption and surrogates, raises
certain concerns. Professor Geoffrey Heeren warns that the
repeated use of procedural surrogates and structural
arguments such as pre-emption masks the trend of taking
away substantive rights for non-citizens and could even
backfire by allowing litigants to strip away immigrant friendly
legislation or policy.13 Even as state legislators in Arizona,
Georgia and Alabama write laws designed to drive the
undocumented from their respective borders; states such as
California, Illinois, and New Mexico have passed laws designed
to welcome the undocumented. Faithful adherence to the preemption doctrine might jeopardize such efforts as
impermissible attempts to interfere with federal immigration
policy. More importantly though, an exclusive focus on preemption and surrogates strategies creates the impression that
the constitutional defect of self-deportation laws is not with the
discrimination or the draconian treatment of people inherent in
these policies, but rather that they are administrated by the
wrong officials. Two of the more objectionable aspects of selfdeportation law, classification of a group of vulnerable people,
11. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
12. See Charles L. Black Jr. , Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law 39-51 (1969), Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution
of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional
Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).
13. See Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who are Not the People: The Changing
Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 Colum. Hum Rts. L. Rev. 367
(2013).
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and harsh treatment of those people designed to drive them out
of their homes, remain unaddressed. However, because the
undocumented remain legally vulnerable to classification
generally,14 and harsh treatment can implicate a spectrum of
traditional state police powers, finding a constitutional defect
that addresses the discrimination and draconian treatment is
elusive. A critical look at Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in
Arizona reveals a potential source of substantive protection
against state discrimination of the undocumented that
addresses both discrimination and the harsh treatment; the
right to travel.
During oral arguments of Arizona v. United States,
Justice Scalia succinctly stated a defense to Arizona’s power to
force out undocumented immigrants: “The Constitution
recognizes that there is such a thing as state borders, and the
states can police their borders.”15 Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion repeatedly relies on the premise that the state of
Arizona is a sovereign body.16 Because one key aspect of
sovereignty is the power to control borders and prevent entry to
unwanted migrants, Justice Scalia argued that Arizona could
exercise such a power to exclude undocumented immigrants.
This justification for controlling migration is not novel or
without support; the constitutional justification for federal
power in regulating immigration is based largely on the
sovereignty of the United States.17 National sovereignty, as the
source of the constitutional power to restrict migration into the
United States, rests on the premise that each nation should
have the ability to define its own membership. Such
membership is primarily defined by who is allowed to enter,
14. Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration Outside the Law (Kindle Locations
2977-2980, 2993) Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition (2014).
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182).
16. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 (1858) (“And the powers of
the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are
exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their
respective spheres.”).
17. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to
the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers
delegated by the Constitution.”).
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reside and become a citizen of the United States. Justice Scalia
argued that Arizona’s sovereignty should lead to a similar
result.
Arizona designed S.B. 1070 to protect its borders and expel
the undocumented from its territory. Arizona decided that its
residents should not include the undocumented and used
several of its police powers to enforce this decision. By
protecting its borders and choosing its residents, Arizona’s
actions were that of a mini-nation, or perhaps a “demisovereignty.”18 If Arizona and each of the several states are
sovereigns, then why shouldn’t their sovereignty allow them to
decide who is allowed to enter and live within its borders?
Despite the common usage by jurists and commentators in
referring to states as “sovereigns,” when each of the several
states formed the union or joined the national government,
each state gave up its sovereign right to do exactly what
Arizona tried to accomplish with S.B. 1070.19 Controlling
borders and deciding the make-up of one’s populace is certainly
a sovereign power,20 and yet, the Constitution denies this
power to state governments by enforcing the right to travel.
The individual states, unlike the United States, do not
have the ability to determine their membership and thus
cannot control their borders in the same manner as the federal
government. Arizona cannot prevent Alaskans from migrating
into its territories, or the poor and homeless from choosing to
reside in the warmth of the Arizona sun. This inability to
control or restrict migration of people into a state’s territory is
rooted in the right to travel and is a fundamental feature of our
Constitution. The right to travel, a foundational aspect of both
federalism and an instrument against discrimination, is an
absolute barrier to self-deportation laws passed by states
trying to evict the undocumented or trying to prevent their
migration into the state.
18. Peter Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of DemiSovereignties, 35 V A . J. I NT ’ L L. 121 (1995).
19. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883) (“The states are
not nations, either as between themselves or towards foreign nations. They
are sovereign within their spheres, but their sovereignty stops short of
nationality. Their political status at home and abroad is that of states in the
United States.”).
20. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7

6

820

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

The right to travel has a variety of incarnations and many
different constitutional homes over its history, a history that
predates the Constitution. Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation expressly forbade States from restricting entry
into the individual states.21 After the ratification of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court, even as it struggled to
pinpoint its textual foundations, regularly struck down state
laws that discouraged migration or travel. The Court in various
periods anchored this right to Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution,22 the
Dormant Commerce Clause,23 the Substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,24 as a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause,25 and most recently, in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Despite
murky explanations and confusing applications, the right to
travel’s function as an invaluable tool in preserving the mobile
and dynamic nature of the nation has never been in doubt.
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Alabama’s H.B. 56 represent the
latest in a long line of attempts by states trying to prevent
certain people from living within their borders. In the past,
States have attempted to prevent the poor from moving into
their territories by criminalizing their transportation or
denying welfare benefits.27 At other times, states have tried to
discourage migration by taxing travelers or denying new
residents the right to vote or access to free non-emergency
care.28 Whether a state takes direct efforts to deny entry to
travelers or tries more indirect measures, such as increasing
taxes or denying benefits, to drive out new residents (travelers
or migrants), the Court has declared that an effort to exclude or
21. Articles of Confederation Article IV.
22. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168 (1869). Ward v. Maryland, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
23. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1942).
24. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
26. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
27. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
28. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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expel people, is an unconstitutional abridgment to the right to
travel.29 Even when a state exercises police powers, such as
allocating employment benefits, criminalization, or taxation, if
such power is used to impact migration, the Court has declared
such actions unconstitutional.30 State self-deportation laws
should meet a similar fate.
The current state-based immigration laws are not meant to
regulate non-citizens within their states and localities, but
rather to drive them out. These state actions are overt
attempts to exclude a specific group of people from migrating,
traveling, or doing any sort of commercial activity within the
respective borders. If Arizona’s H.B. 1070, Alabama’s H.B. 56,
or even the Hazelton ordinances had targeted any group that
consisted of United States citizens, such as indigents, the
mentally impaired,31 or convicted child molesters, the laws
would have been struck down as an impermissible violation of
the right to travel. As the Supreme Court explains, “the
purpose of inhibiting migration . . . [of] persons into the State is
constitutionally impermissible.”32 And yet, because the
particular group of people involved are not citizens of the
United States and do not have federal authorization to remain
in the country, this limitation on state power has not been
seriously considered by federal courts to date. This oversight
ignores the anti-discrimination purpose right to travel and its
role in ensuring that membership decisions are left to the
federal government.
Part I of this Article discusses the limitation of the preemption doctrine on state self-deportation laws. Part II
discusses a short history of the Supreme Court’s application of
the right to travel. Part III explains why the lack of federal
authorization or immigrant status does not exclude people from
the right to travel’s protection. Part IV discusses how the right
to travel relates to citizenship and how the undocumented may
exercise what has been described as a privilege or immunity of
citizenship. Finally, Part V examines how the current state29. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at
30. See Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
31. Bethesda Lutheran Home & Servs., Inc. v. Leean, 122 F.3d 443 (7th
Cir. 1997).
32. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
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based “self-deportation” immigration laws violate the right to
travel.
I.

The Limitations of Pre-emption

The Arizona Court relied on pre-emption in striking down
many of SB 1070’s provisions. Pre-emption as a doctrine
involves examining whether state law unconstitutionally
interferes or conflicts with federal law. In traditional preemption analysis, state laws can be pre-empted in either an
express manner or in an implied manner.33 Express preemption usually would have congressional language that
clearly indicates that state laws are not tolerated. For implied
pre-emption, it can exist in one of two ways; conflict preemption where state laws conflict directly with federal law or
goals, and field pre-emption, where federal law is so
comprehensive in an area that no space is left for the state.34
The Arizona Court employed a variety of different preemption analysis on each provision of SB 1070 separately.35 For
certain provisions, such as the Arizona registration provision,
the Court found “that the Federal Government has occupied
the field of alien registration.”36 With other provisions the
Court employed an implied conflict pre-emption analysis. One
of the key rulings from Arizona was that State laws that
encroached on the use of federal enforcement discretion would
be pre-empted.37 The Court also struck down one of the main
strategies that architects of self-deportation laws had tried to
use; the mirror-theory.38 What was largely left untouched by
33. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 36:9 (7th ed. 2009).
34. Id. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501.
35. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501-10. See also, Jennifer M. Chacón, The
Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577
(2012).
36. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501.
37. Id. at 2506.
38. Id. at 2502-03. For a detailed discussion of the history of the “mirror
theory”, please see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality
of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J.
251, 253-54 (2011). And Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What
States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR.
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the Arizona decision, and which continues to be a source of
conflict, is when states regulate in areas that do not have
federal analogues. Federal law does not regulate non-citizen
housing, or their economic and social activity in the manner
that some self-deportation laws, such as HB 56, or the
municipalities of Hazelton, City of Freemont and Farmers
Branch attempted to do. Without any federal analogues, these
laws cannot be analyzed under an implied conflict analysis and
instead must be analyzed using “field” preemption principles.
The problem with using field pre-emption analysis comes with
how to frame what “field” the state law is trying to regulate.
A.

A Difference in Framing: When do States and Cities
Engage in Immigration Policy?

One of the most difficult aspects of immigration preemption law has been deciding when a state law should be
considered an “alienage” law or an “immigration” law.39 State
laws that consider alienage has existed and upheld from nearly
the beginning of the nation’s history.40 At the same time as
Professor Motomura has written, ““Alienage” rules may be
surrogates for “immigration” rules. Often, the intended and/or
actual effect of an alienage rule is to affect immigration
patterns.”41 At what point can a state law that regulates noncitizens, becomes an “immigration law” that should be
preempted? Prior to the Arizona court, the answer was
confusing, and after Arizona, the answer continues to be
confusing, especially for state laws42 that regulate in an area
L.J. 459, 475 (2008) (“[s]tate governments possess the authority to
criminalize particular conduct concerning illegal immigration, provided that
they do so in a way that mirrors the terms of federal law.”)
39. Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration and Alienage Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 201, 202 (1994). (“As traditionally
understood, "immigration law" concerns the admission and expulsion of
aliens, and "alienage law" embraces other matters relating to their legal
status.”)
40. L. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference That Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1087 (1994)
41. Motomura, 35 Va. J. Intl. L. at 202.
42. For the purposes of this paper, “state laws” refers to not just laws
passed by the State legislature or Assembly, but also includes city ordinances
and public referendums as they are considered to be wielding power granted
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that federal laws do not.
Three separate circuit courts after the Arizona decision
had a chance to examine rental restrictions aimed at the
undocumented, and one court, the Eleventh Circuit decided on
the contracts provision of HB 56 passed by Alabama. How the
circuit courts decided the fate of these two provisions plays an
important role in understanding the potential limitation of preemption.
In 2006 and 2007 Hazelton Pennsylvania passed an
ordinance titled, “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance”
and a rental registration ordinance. In 2010, the Third Circuit
ruled such ordinances were pre-empted by federal law,
however, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the
Third Circuit and subsequently decided the fate of Arizona’s
SB1070.43 The Hazelton ordinance essentially made all leases
entered into with the undocumented “void.” Originally, in the
decision prior to remand, the Third Circuit decided that such
restrictions were field pre-empted and post remand the Third
Circuit found no reason to revisit this decision. The court
decided that the “field” at issue was the immigration policy
generally. Because Hazelton or the State of Pennsylvania could
not make immigration determinations on their own, any laws
that attempted to occupy such a field would be found to be preempted. The court connected rental restrictions with a form of
regulating residency in the United States. The court
summarized its position thusly, “[t]he housing provisions of
Hazleton’s ordinances are nothing more than a thinly veiled
attempt to regulate residency under the guise of a regulation of
rental housing. By barring aliens lacking lawful immigration
status from rental housing in Hazleton, the housing provisions
go to the core of an alien’s residency. States and localities have
no power to regulate residency based on immigration status.”44
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch examined a
similar rental restriction and noted, “[t]his is because no alien
with an unlawful status will be able to obtain the basic need of
by the State. See generally, Olivas, Michael, Immigration-Related State and
Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for
Enforcement, 2007 U Chi Legal F. 27 (2007).
43. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013).
44. Id.at 315.
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shelter through a rental contract. Illegal aliens will therefore
have no recourse but to self-deport from Farmers Branch.” In
order to find this result unconstitutional, Judge Reavley in his
concurrence went on to explain that “forced migration of illegal
aliens conflicts with the careful scheme created by the INA and
burdens the national prerogative to decide which aliens may
live in this country and which illegal aliens should be
removed.”45 The Eleventh Circuit in Alabama v. United States
used the same logic and reasoning.46 Under pre-emption
analysis the courts needed to make the connection that
expulsion from a city or state is in practice an attempt to expel
a person from the United States entirely.
The Eighth Circuit unlike the en banc Fifth Circuit or the
Third Circuit upheld the city of Freemont’s rental restrictions.
The Eighth Circuit did not quarrel with the Third Circuit’s
analysis of the effect of the rental restriction in discouraging
migration out of the municipality, but instead disagreed as to
whether it occupied the field of immigration regulation. “Laws
designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present aliens
from residing within a particular locality are not tantamount to
immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in the
country.”47 It is on this basis that the Eighth Circuit upheld the
rental restrictions as not field pre-empted and later on using
similar justification found it free from conflict pre-emption as
well.
The disagreements between the Eighth circuit and the
Third and Fifth Circuit can be traced back to one of the
Supreme Court’s first pre-emption decision in Chy Lung.48 In
Chy Lung, California set high bond amounts for certain
Chinese woman attempting to de-board ships that landed in
California.49 The Court ruled such policies interfered with
federal treaty power and the ability to control immigration.50
45. Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (concurring opinion by Judge
Reavley.).
46. It is also clear to us that the expulsion power Alabama seeks to
exercise through [the contract provision] conflicts with Congress's
comprehensive statutory framework governing alien removal.
47. Keller, 719 F.3d at 941 (8th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)
48. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Because the migrants were not just entering the state of
California, but at the same time was entering in the United
States, the state policy’s interference with federal immigration
policy was direct and obvious.51 And yet, when states in the
interior, such as Nebraska or Pennsylvania, impose barriers for
the undocumented the effect on immigration becomes more
indirect as these migrants have already entered into the
United States.
At this point, an Equal Protection case steps in and does
the heavy lifting for circuits that struck down the rental
restrictions. In Traux v. Rauch, the Court struck down an
Arizona employment restriction that affected all non-citizens
including lawful permanent residents.52 The Court examined
the employment restriction under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and remarked, “[State authority]
does not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to
lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the
ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no
argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose
of the Amendment to secure.”53 The language of Traux was
focused on Equal Protection concerns. But in deciding the
Equal Protection question, it had to decide Arizona’s interest in
passing the employment restriction. The Court ruled that
whatever interest Arizona may have, it cannot include
preventing employment of lawful permanent residents.
Denying employment to lawful permanent residents would
deny them “entrance and abode,” because “instead of enjoying .
. . their full scope the privileges conferred by the admission,
[they] would be segregated in such of the States as chose to
offer hospitality.”54 The Court reasoned that forcing
immigrants out of Arizona would affect national immigration
policy because other states might follow suit.55 All of the
51. Id.
52. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id. at 42.
55. It is important to note that Traux’s comments about state exclusion
impacting national immigration, were only used to examine state power or
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circuits that struck down the self-deportation laws following
Arizona relied on this reasoning from Traux. The Eighth
Circuit’s response in Fremont was simple, “[w]e are unwilling
to speculate whether other state and local governments would
adopt similar measures, whether those measures would survive
non-preemption challenges, and the impact of any such trend
on federal immigration policies.”56
While the logic of Traux seems sound enough on the
surface, there are flaws on its application to pre-emption
jurisprudence. The language of how forcing a person out of any
one state could prevent him or her from living in any state was
an examination of state interest under Equal Protection. The
hypothetical that if one state could exclude may lead to other
states also excluding non-citizens demonstrated the lack of
state interest in controlling migration, not a direct example of
preemption. Applying this reasoning to pre-emption
necessitates that the power to exclude non-citizens from a state
border conflicts with the power to exclude people from the
national border because of how that power can be wielded in
the aggregate. It is this leap that some courts, such as the
Freemont court found too tenuous and remote to make. Second,
Traux was also focused on a state curtailing a right given to an
individual by federal auspices. The lawful permanent resident
status of the petitioner was key, for the Court relied on the
notion that he was “admitted with the privilege of entering and
abiding in the United States, and hence of entering and abiding
in any State in the Union.” The federal authorization set up the
conflict with state law as lawful permanent residents were
explicitly given authorization to not just enter the United
States, but also, “entering and abiding in any State in the
Union.”57 A State’s attempt to prevent migration of lawful
permanent residents would conflict with federal law, precisely
because federal law authorized a person to travel and live
anywhere in the United States. Regulating the undocumented
would not have this worry.
When Justice Scalia’s dissent defended state efforts to
protect their own borders as sovereign bodies, the clear
state interest and not a description of immigration pre-emption.
56. Keller v. Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 942 (8th Cir. 2013).
57. Traux at 42.
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implication was that he viewed such efforts not as
“immigration” law, but rather closer to the spectrum of
“alienage” law. Absent a state law such as the one in Chy Lung,
which prevented noncitizens from entering not just California,
but the United States, its effects on national immigration
policy remains indirect and in some instances speculative. And
yet there is no disagreement that such laws affect the
migration of people into and out of state borders, in fact, that is
their very purpose. Using preemption analysis to strike down
state self-deportation laws requires classifying such efforts as
affecting national migration policy, but using a right to travel
analysis only requires acknowledging what has been
universally accepted, that such efforts have a direct impact on
migration of people into and out of state borders.
Critiques of preemption used against state regulation has
met with a variety of critics, from those who wish to expand
state regulation of immigration,58 to those who worry that
preemption may leave noncitizens more vulnerable.59
Defenders of preemption have not only referred to traditional
federal concerns, but also to values such as equality and
establishing membership. In 1995, Professor Motomura
responded to a proposal by Professor Spiro to allow for more
state regulation by laying out an “equal protection” defense
based on the decision from Plyler v. Doe. Recognizing that
normally the federal government has no greater ability to
violate the equal protection clause, he did articulate a federal
interest that states did not; creating a national identity.
Federal classifications, including ones that delineate the
undocumented, could be justified under a federal project of
forming a national identity, while states should not be allowed
to wade into immigration regulation.60 Invoking Michael
Walzer, he feared that state regulation of immigration would
lead to a “thousand petty fortresses.” By 2014 Professor
Motomura gave a more full-throated defense of immigration
preemption in his book, Immigration Outside the Law, but
58. Spiro, Peter, Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of
Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 121 (1994).
59. See Heeren¸supra note 13.
60. Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int’l L., 201, 203 (1995).
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equality and national identity remained central.
In Immigration Outside the Law, Motomura embraced preemption as a strong basis for disallowing state regulation of
immigrants and immigration. However, equality and the
national project of deciding membership remained key in his
analysis. Despite acknowledging that distinctions between
migrants who are in the country with authorization and those
without may be constitutionally allowed, the importance of
equality, and eventual access to equality remained paramount.
According to Motomura preemption in the immigration context
is not solely a structural concern dealing with relationships
between states and the federal government. Instead, when
applied to immigration law, preemption becomes a prophylactic
against violations of equality. “More generally, preemption is
appropriate if an expanded state or local role substantially
increases the risk of undetected or unremedied constitutional
violations.”61 In describing the federal power over immigration,
Professor Motomura again wrote about the project to create
national identity and membership by declaring that it was the
federal government’s province to “to decide who belongs and
who does not.”62
Whatever one’s opinion may be about immigration
preemption63 an overlooked doctrine, the right to travel has
already directly addressed and incorporated the two main
themes of Professor Motomura’s preemption theory. The right
to travel protects against discrimination and is one of the
purest examples of the limitation of state power to control
identity and community membership.
61. Motomura, Hiroshi (2014-06-02). Immigration Outside the Law
(Kindle Locations 3037-3038). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
62. Motomura, Hiroshi (2014-06-02). Immigration Outside the Law
(Kindle Locations 3071-3073). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. “The
federal government’s lawsuits against Arizona, Alabama, Utah, and South
Carolina reflect its concern that these states have threatened the federal
government’s constitutional role— as it emerged from the Reconstruction
Amendments following the American Civil War— to decide who belongs and
who does not.”
63. There have been several different scholars who view the preemption
wielded by the Arizona court in different ways, Kerry Abrams in “Plenary
Preemption.” 99 Virginia Law Review 601 (2013) described the power as one
protecting the federal “plenary” power which could similarly be considered as
the power to decide membership and sovereignty.
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II. History and Evolution of the Right To Travel
Throughout our nation’s constitutional history, the right to
travel has played a crucial role in defining our federalist
structure. It has promoted national unity by preventing states
from frustrating federal power and purpose, and at the same
time has protected individuals from discrimination and
unequal treatment. At the start, the right to travel prevented
any direct interference with the free flow of people over state
borders such as with direct taxation and creating criminal
liability for travel. But during the civil rights era, the right to
travel also began to affect not just direct barriers to migration,
but indirect means such as discrimination and mistreatment of
classes of people in order to drive them out. The right to travel
is more than just allowing people, like commerce, to flow from
state to state. The right, especially after the Civil War, is a
prohibition against states from exercising membership
decisions, not just on a national level, which would interfere
with national immigration policy, but also membership
decisions for each individual state. While the Citizenship
clause prevents States from denying membership to those born
within a state’s borders, the right to travel prevents States
from erecting barriers to membership from migrants.
Individual states may be sovereignties in many ways, but their
key defect, is that they cannot control who can join and who
must leave their state.
The right to travel, and specifically the right to interstate
travel, enjoys a long and well-recognized history in the United
States predating the Constitution. Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation describes an early ancestor to the right to travel:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship and intercourse among the people of
the different States in this Union, the free
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted,
shall be entitled to all privileges or immunities of
free citizens in the several States; and the people
of each State shall have free ingress and regress
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to and from any other State.64
The Articles of Confederation Article IV’s language
referring to free ingress and regress did not end up in the text
of the ratified Constitution, but, nevertheless, courts continue
to recognize the fundamental aspect of the right, and rarely
question its existence. Despite this nearly universal
recognition, the Supreme Court has been inarticulate and
deliberately vague about the right to travel’s origins or
applications. The Court has described the right to travel as
part of the “Privileges or Immunities” clause of Article IV of the
Constitution,65 as concomitant with national citizenship,66 as
part of the Dormant Commerce Clause,67 as part of a
fundamental right protected by Equal Protection Clause,68 and
most recently, as part of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 While a varied and storied
history is by no means an unusual characteristic of a
constitutional right, the right to travel is an anomaly mainly
because, while successive courts have described the right
differently, none have expressly overruled or attempted to
disqualify a previous understanding of the right to travel. As
will soon become apparent, the right enjoys a fractured and
diverse nature that appears to be an amalgam of several
different constitutional rights and concerns. A closer
examination will reveal a powerful and underappreciated
protection against discrimination and the tool to keep the
national project of membership and identity away from the
States.

64. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV.
65. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) (stating that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the right of a citizen of one state
to travel into another state in order to engage in commerce, trade, or
business); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (holding that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause provides “the right of free ingress into other
states, and egress from them.”).
66. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867).
67. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1942).
68. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 654 (1969); Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982).
69. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999).
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The Passenger Cases—The Beginning of a Winding Road

One of the Supreme Court’s first opportunities to recognize
the right to interstate travel came when Massachusetts and
New York created different head taxes for passengers on ships
seeking port in Boston and New York.70 Eight Justices wrote
eight separate opinions examining two different state statutes,
one in New York and one in Boston.71 Both statutes placed
taxes on ship carriers and used the origin of the passengers to
determine the rate; passengers from certain states and
countries increased the taxes levied.
The New York statute72 required taxes to be paid if the
ship originated in “foreign” ports. Passengers from other states
were charged twenty-five cents for every month if the ship was
from Rhode Island, New Jersey or Connecticut, while
passengers from other states were charged twenty-five cents
for each voyage. Foreign passengers were charged a dollar and
fifty cents if they were in the cabin, or a dollar if they were in
steerage. The Massachusetts statute73 required all “alien”
70. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 283.
71. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration
Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993), for a more detailed
discussion of the case’s impact on immigration law.
72. N.Y. Rev. Stat. § 7 (1827)
1. From the master of every vessel from a foreign port, for
himself and each cabin passenger, one dollar and fifty cents;
for each steerage passenger, mate, sailor, or mariner, one
dollar. 2. From the master of each coasting-vessel, for each
person on board, twenty-five cents; but no coasting-vessel
from the States of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island shall pay for more than one voyage in each month,
computing from the first voyage in each year.
73. Mass. Rev. Stat. § 2-3 (1837)
Sec. 1st. When any vessel shall arrive at any port or
harbour within this State, from any port or place without
the same, with alien passengers on board, the officer or
officers whom the mayor and aldermen of the city, or the
selectmen of the town, where it is proposed to land such
passengers, are hereby authorized and required to appoint,
shall go on board such vessels and examine into the
condition of said passengers.
Sec. 2d. If, on such
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passengers to undergo inspection and, if they were “lunatics,”
“maimed,” or if the alien would be deemed to be unable to
maintain themselves, a bond of a thousand dollars had to be
issued to ensure that the “lunatic or indigent passenger” would
not become a charge of the city of Boston for ten years.74
This early attempt by localities to control immigration
produced eight different opinions including a dissent by Chief
Justice Taney. The Justices argued over the power of federal
immigration, taxation and the meaning of Article I Section 8.
The discussion also touched upon what Justice Scalia worried
about on April 25, 2012 when he asked about Arizona’s
sovereignty. Do the States have complete control over their
borders with the limited exception of allowing federal agents to
travel into and through the states?
Justice Maclean considered the migration of free people as
“commerce” and determined that regulation of such commerce
would violate the Commerce Clause.75 As to the question of how
examination, there shall be found among said passengers
any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged, or infirm person,
incompetent, in the opinion of the officer so examining, to
maintain themselves, or who have been paupers in any
other country, no such alien passenger shall be permitted to
land until the master, owner, consignee, or agent of such
vessel shall have given to such city or town a bond in the
sum of one thousand dollars, with good and sufficient
security, that no such lunatic or indigent passenger shall
become a city, town, or State charge within ten years from
the date of said bond. Sec. 3d. No alien passenger, other
than those spoken of in the preceding section, shall be
permitted to land until the master, owner, consignee, or
agent of such vessel shall pay to the regularly appointed
boarding officer the sum of two dollars for each passenger so
landing; and the money so collected shall be paid into the
treasury of the city or town, to be appropriated as the city or
town may direct for the support of foreign paupers.
74. Such a bond being a very early ancestor to the affidavits of support
being required for immigrant arrivals in the United States currently, though
it is difficult to imagine a $1000 bond be payable by most people during that
time period.
75. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (1 How.) at 405 (“In a commercial
sense, no just distinction can be made, as regards the law in question,
between the transportation of merchandise and passengers. For the
transportation of both the ship-owner realizes a profit, and each is the subject
of a commercial regulation by Congress. When the merchandise is taken from
the ship, and becomes mingled with the property of the people of the State,
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to treat foreigners, Justice Maclean wrote “[e]xcept to guard its
citizens against diseases and paupers, the municipal power of a
State cannot prohibit the introduction of foreigners brought to
this country under the authority of Congress.”76 Justice
Maclean goes on to explain, “If this power to tax passengers
from a foreign country belongs to a State, a tax, on the same
principle, may be imposed on all persons coming into or passing
through it from any other State of the Union.”77 Justice Wayne
agreed with his colleague on the application of the Commerce
Clause and then wrote about the interplay of federal and state
powers when it came to foreigners. Justice Wayne wrote:
Having surrendered to the United States the
sovereign police power over commerce, to be
exercised by Congress or the treaty-making
power, it is necessarily a part of the power of the
United States to determine who shall come to
and reside in the United States for the purposes
of trade, independently of every other condition
of admittance which the States may attempt to
impose upon such persons.78
Justices Maclean and Wayne created the framework, called the
immigration pre-emption doctrine, for what would later be the
basis of the Arizona v. United States ruling some 150 years
later.
Justice Taney, in his dissent, put forward what would later
become the right to travel. He began the opinion with a heated
discussion of how the power to compel entry of foreigners into a
state’s jurisdictional territory must be considered part of the
state’s police power to expel unwanted persons that are deemed
to be a danger. Justice Taney wrote:

like other property, it is subject to the local law; but until this shall take
place, the merchandise is an import, and is not subject to the taxing power of
the State, and the same rule applies to passengers. When they leave the ship,
and mingle with the citizens of the State, they become subject to its laws.”).
76. Id. at 406.
77. Id. at 407.
78. Id. at 425-26.
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States have a right to remove from among their
people, and to prevent from entering the State,
any person, or class or description of persons,
whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the
interests and welfare of its citizens; and that the
State has the exclusive right to determine, in its
sound discretion, whether the danger does or
does not exist, free from the control of the
general government.79
The language referred to “people” and Justice Taney’s concern
for the ability to protect the state’s own welfare would
naturally apply not only to foreigners, but anyone entering a
State’s borders. However, Justice Taney clarified that the
State’s interest in controlling its borders stopped short of
citizens and his explanation gave rise to the constitutional
doctrine of the right to travel.
According to Justice Taney, a state’s power to expel is
limited to foreigners. “We are all citizens of the United States;
and, as members of the same community, must have the right
to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own States.”80 The very act of
creating a Union required free access through the different
parts of that Union. Unlike Justice Maclean, Justice Taney
ignored the Commerce Clause, or any text from the
Constitution in making his declaration. Rather, Justice Taney
pointed out that the right to travel, including the ingress and
egress through state territories, is necessary for the federal
government to function as required by the Constitution.
B.

The Right to Travel Emerges as both an Intergovernmental
Right and as a Personal Right

While the Passenger Cases set the stage, it was Nevada’s
attempt to tax people leaving its state that brought the right to

79. Id. at 467.
80. Id. at 492. It should be noted that Taney’s vision of a national form
of citizenship subsequently played an important role in the infamous Dred
Scott Case.
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travel to the forefront and allowed it to emerge as an
independently recognized fundamental right under the
Constitution. Two years after the Civil War, the Supreme
Court struck down a tax levied by Nevada on all outbound
passengers from the state.81 The Court dispensed with the two
provisions that swayed the Passenger Cases Court, deciding
that Nevada’s tax did not affect interstate commerce nor
imposed a “non-universal” duty. Instead, the Court ruled that
Nevada’s
tax
threatened
the
federal
government’s
constitutional role, including the ability to declare war which
necessarily also includes being able to raise an army and
transport troops over state lines.82 The reference to federal war
powers is unsurprising given how close in time this case was to
the Civil War, a point Justice Miller drove home by noting that
if Tennessee or other States during the rebellion had imposed
similar taxes as those imposed by Nevada, the United States
could not have paid, and thus may have imperiled the war
effort.
Interference with federal power was reason enough to
strike down Nevada’s tax, but the Court went on to rule that
the tax infringed on an individual civil right as well. For the
Crandall Court, the right to interstate travel protects not just
federal power, but also protects an individual’s ability to
transact with the federal government, which in turn is
necessary to protect against state intrusions on a host of
constitutional rights.83 States that burden travel or prevent
movement through their territories interfere not just with the
flow of federal power, but prevent people from seeking the
protection of the federal government. Given its historical
81. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
82. Id. at 44 (“If this right is dependent in any sense, however limited,
upon the pleasure of a State, the government itself may be overthrown by an
obstruction to its exercise.”).
83. See id, (“[T]he citizen also has correlative rights. He has the right to
come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its
protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He
has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of
foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land
offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and
this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil
he must pass in the exercise of it.”).
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perspective, the Crandall Court’s focus on the federal
government and its powers is not surprising, nevertheless it is
important to remember that the decision predated the
Fourteenth Amendment, which would itself become a primary
limitation on state power.84
C.

The Muddled Mess of Right to Travel—An Incident to State
Citizenship?

Despite the references to federal power and the Commerce
Clause in the Crandall court’s language, a distinctly separate
line of cases created an entirely different basis for the right to
travel using a historical connection to Article IV of the Articles
of Confederation. In 1917, Arizona was the site of an infamous
labor conflict aptly titled the “Bisbee Deportations.” Executives
of a coal mining company heard of a planned strike by miners
and were rebuffed by their efforts to get federal authorities to
quell dissent and a conspiracy was hatched. Henry Wheeler,
the Sherriff of Cochise County deputized several men from the
town and began rounding up IWW union supporters. The
Sheriff and his deputies began to forcibly remove the workers,
not only from the town, but also transported them on a freight
train to New Mexico and threatened their lives if they were to
return.85 The deportees were 1186 men, with over 400 of them
foreign born. This attempt at strike-busting would later involve
the Governor of New Mexico and federal authorities.
Eventually, the Sheriff and coal company executives were
indicted in federal court on four counts, with the charges all
variations of the first count:
[Conspiring] to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate 221 named persons, alleged to be
citizens of the United States residing in Arizona,
84. The case was decided in March of 1868, while the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in July of 1868.
85. Report on the Bisbee Deportations. Made by the President's Mediation
Commission to the President of the United States, Bisbee, Arizona, Nov. 6,
1917,
http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/bisbee/primarysources/reports/presid
ent/index.php.
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of rights or privileges secured to them by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; that is
to say, the right and privilege pertaining to
citizens of said state peacefully to reside and
remain therein and to be immune from unlawful
deportation from that state to another.86
The indictments were dismissed on a finding that no federal
authority existed to prosecute the men for these crimes87 and
the Supreme Court upheld that decision by the District court.
The eight Justice majority decision acknowledged that the
miners’ constitutional rights were violated and went so far as
describing the violated right to travel as “fundamental” and
one which encompassed the ability to “peacefully to dwell
within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from
place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and
egress therefrom.”88 However, the fundamental nature of the
right was not enough to sustain the indictment as the Court
decided that its Article IV origins limited the federal
government’s enforcement power.
The right to travel as a subset of the privileges and
immunities contained in Article IV of the Constitution was not
a novel position, even if it was primarily dicta. The Wheeler
Court relied on a pair of cases decided right after Crandall to
declare the right to travel as a privilege and immunity of state
citizenship and thus should be enforced primarily by the
several states.89 The two cases, Paul v. Virginia,90 and Ward v.
Maryland91 dealt with discrimination against out of state
commercial agents (one an insurance corporation, and the
other traders), the Court compared Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation with Article IV of the Constitution and noted
that the “free ingress and egress” appeared in the Articles of

86. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 292 (1920).
87. The federal kidnapping statute did not exist at this time and would
not until after the infamous Lindbergh kidnapping.
88. Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 293.
89. Id. at 295.
90. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168 (1868).
91. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).

25

2014]

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

839

Confederation but was absent from the Constitution.92 The
Court viewed the deliberate redaction of the “free ingress and
egress” language as a form of editorial shortcut rather than a
deliberate choice by the Constitution’s drafters and therefore
read the right back into the privileges and immunities for the
Constitution.93 The Court made the extraordinary step of reinserting the language because it viewed the right to free travel
was essential to the privileges and immunities clause, which
was not expressly enumerated anywhere in the text of the
Constitution.
Ward and Paul did not deal with direct obstruction of the
right to travel; nobody was prevented from entering Virginia or
Maryland, no taxes were imposed on travelers as in Crandall
and there was no forcible transportation across state lines as
with Wheeler. The complainant in Paul was an out-of state
corporation that objected to higher incorporation fees, while in
Ward, traders objected to a higher tax levied on them compared
to resident businesses. The Court recognized the core
complaint as discrimination94 but waxed eloquently on the
right to travel as the means to strike down the state laws.
These began the Court’s recognition that discriminating
treatment, as much as direct barriers, can affect the flow of
migration.
Categorizing the right to travel as a privilege and
immunity of state citizenship protected by Article IV did not sit
comfortably for many jurists. By the 1940s, Justices began to
object to the placement of the right as an incident to state
citizenship. In Edwards v. California,95 California criminalized
the transportation of an indigent into the state. A majority of
the Supreme Court relied on one of the justifications used by
92. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 180 (“gives [citizens of other States] the right of
free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it
secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws.”); See also,
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1856) (discussing the relationship with the
Articles of Confederation.).
93. The Supreme Court was heavily influenced by the landmark decision
by Judge Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823)
(no. 3,230).
94. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870).
95. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1942).
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the Passenger Cases court and ruled that the California statute
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, rather than Article
IV. However, several concurring Justices were uncomfortable
with this justification as it reduced migration into a
commercial activity and instead articulated a different basis to
strike down the California law. The Dormant Commerce
Clause, which prevents bias in favor of in-state commerce,
seemed a strange place to prevent discrimination against the
poor.
Two concurring opinions, one by Justice Douglas and one
by Justice Black both cited the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as the source of the right to
travel and declare it a right of “national citizenship.” Justice
Douglas rejected prior case law describing Article IV as the
home to the right to travel by pointing out that the Crandall
decision could not have meant Article IV, since Nevada taxed
its own citizens as well as any other traveler. Justice Douglas
wrote that the right to travel “rises to a higher constitutional
dignity than that afforded by state citizenship.” For Douglas,
the right to travel should be an incident to national citizenship
found in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Article IV’s
state Citizenship Clause. While Justice Douglas opinion was
just a concurrence, the Court would later resurrect it some fifty
years later.
D. Fundamental Right under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment
Fear of the poor did not abate after the Edwards decision,
and states did not give up on their efforts to exclude them. In
1969, Pennsylvania and Connecticut, along with the District of
Columbia, decided that they would try to control the migration
of the indigent by cutting off welfare benefits to new residents,
thereby actively discouraging welfare recipients from
migrating.96 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the
right to travel not only would prevent a state from directly
barring “ingress” into the state, but would also prevent the
state from indirectly discouraging migration and encouraging
96. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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exodus.
The Shapiro decision changed the course of the right to
travel jurisprudence in a couple of important ways. First,
despite nearly a century of jurisprudence, the Court became
reticent about the origin or textual foundation for the
constitutional right to travel.97 Secondly, even as the Court
shied from textually anchoring the right to travel, it introduced
the Equal Protection Clause as a means to protect against state
actions inhibiting the right to travel.
Unlike Crandall, Edwards, or Wheeler, the states in
Shapiro were not directly inhibiting people from physically
entering their states. And unlike Ward or Paul, the difference
in treatment was directed towards new residents, not out-ofstate visitors. These differences were significant; Article IV
only protected against disparate treatment of out-of-staters,98
and while taxing travelers could be seen as affecting commerce,
refusal to give welfare benefits was not seen as violating the
interstate commerce clause, especially when a federal statute
encouraged a one-year residency requirement for aid to
dependent children.
By refusing to pin down the textual basis for the right to
travel, the Court in Shapiro could use the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down the residency requirements without
having to argue over the textual limits of the right to travel.
The Court first declared that the residency requirements were
creating classifications between “new” and “old” state
residents. This description would not be enough on its face, as
this classification did not involve any “suspect” classes such as
race. However, under Equal Protection jurisprudence, state
statutes can be forced to endure strict scrutiny not just because
they use suspect classifications, but also if they infringe on a
“fundamental” right.99 The Court ruled that not only were the
97. See id. at 630 (“We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.”). The
Court’s reluctance to pin textual source to the right to travel was presaged in
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966) (“Although there have been
recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the
constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those
differences further.”).
98. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
99. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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states creating classifications based on time of residency, but
also that this classification’s purpose was to penalize and chill
a person from exercising his or her fundamental constitutional
right to travel.100 By describing the right as fundamental,
without pinning it to a particular constitutional provision, the
Court was able to void the state statutes under Equal
Protection without having to deal with some of the limitations
that would have been inherent under Article IV (which does
not apply to a state’s treatment of their own citizens),
substantive due process, or the Commerce Clause. Not only did
the use of Equal Protection analysis sidestep these limitations,
but it fit well into the scheme of preventing discrimination
against the poor.
In the years that followed, the Court continued to use this
type of analysis whenever faced with residential requirements
for certain programs. The Court struck down the denial of free
non-emergency medical care for new residents,101 the denial of
voting rights for new residents,102 the preference for a state to
hire veterans who entered the armed forces while a resident of
that state,103 and even the denial of dividend benefits given out
by a state to newer residents.104 While the Court vacillated on
how to distinguish valid residency requirements105 from invalid
residency requirements, one of the keys for the Court was
whether or not the State classification would impermissibly
discourage migration of certain people into the state.106
100. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). “If a law has ‘no
other purpose…than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it (is) patently
unconstitutional.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968)).
101. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
102. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
103. Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
104. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 (1982). (Justice O’Connor,
in a concurring opinion, wanted to tie the right to travel back to Article IV of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.).
105. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
106. One of the key points of confusion for the Court was when residency
requirements required “strict scrutiny” or just “rational basis.” The strict
scrutiny cases all dealt with situations where the infringement on the right to
migrate were much higher, where the benefits of residency were such that it
was more than just affecting the choice to migrate, but had a significant
impact, such as the denial of key welfare benefits, the ability to get non-
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The years following Shapiro produced a flurry of litigation,
including deciding how and in what circumstances the right to
travel
could
be
conditioned.107
Nevertheless,
both
commentators and the Court were uncomfortable with labeling
the right to travel as “fundamental” and yet refusing to pin
down a constitutional source, and in Zobel, Justice O’Connor
explicitly tried to tie the right to travel to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV.108
E.

Privileges or Immunities Clause: The Three Aspects of the
Right to Interstate Travel

In 1992, California’s decision to change their welfare
benefits program gave the Supreme Court a chance to clarify
the muddled jurisprudence of the right to interstate travel and
lay out some concrete guidance to states on when the right to
travel may be implicated. Saenz v. Roe109 appeared at first to be
a rehash of Shapiro: California required its new residents to
have a full year of residency before allowing them full access to
California’s welfare program. There were two essential
differences from the Shapiro case. First, California did not
deny new residents all benefits; instead California explicitly
gave new residents the same benefits they would have gotten
from the State of their prior residence. Secondly, the federal
government explicitly authorized durational residency
requirements for welfare benefits in a separate piece of
legislation.
emergency health care versus the ability to get divorces, or in-state college
tuition.
107. In 1981 the Court had to decide whether a person convicted of child
abandonment could be restricted from leaving the state of Georgia by
prosecution as a felon. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981). The Court
recognized that the right to interstate travel was undisputedly part of the
federal Constitution and yet recognized the varying theories and historical
confusion as to the exact source of the right. Without resolving the confusion,
Justice Stevens explained that, despite the fundamental nature of the right
to travel, restrictions to the right to travel have always been recognized in
certain circumstances, especially in the context of crimes. A more detailed
discussion appears in Section 2, infra.
108. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
109. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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The first difference—treating new residents to California
in the same manner as they would have been in their original
state—was a crucial distinguishing factor from Shapiro. While
the Court in Shapiro and Maricopa County forbade
classifications that “punished” people for traveling, California’s
policy did not impose any burdens on new residents, as they
would receive the same benefits they had prior to moving. This
circumstance sidestepped the language from Shapiro and its
progeny requiring some sort of “burdening”—even though
California treated new residents differently than established
residents.
The second difference, federal authorization, also
foreclosed another previously relied upon source of the right to
travel. The Dormant Commerce Clause, the textual source
relied upon in Edwards, provides no protection in the face of
federal authorization. While states may not burden interstate
commerce on their own, any authorization by Congress would
allow states to affect interstate commerce without violating the
Dormant Commerce Clause.110And finally, because the
Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV is limited to
protecting only temporary travelers or non-in state residents,111
the Court was left with a dilemma: either California’s
classification system was constitutional or the source of the
right to interstate travel had yet to be discovered.
Justice Stevens surveyed the long history of the right to
travel and identified three separate aspects to the right to
interstate travel. First, any actual barrier to traveling into and
out of the state would offend the right to travel. Second,
temporary “out of state” visitors could not be discriminated
against. Finally, in a move that both adopted and distinguished
Shapiro, Justice Stevens explained that the right to interstate
travel includes, “for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens

110. There remains a question as to whether federal authorization
would render permissible what is otherwise a violation of the Comity Clause.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007).
111. Justice O’Connor had consistently argued that there was no
problem in relying on Article IV protections for new residents; she considered
“new” residents on the same footing as travelers.
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of that State.”112 This formulation allowed the Court to avoid
framing the issue as “punishing” a choice to migrate into the
State. The very aspect of creating a classification for new
residents was considered “punishment” enough. The Court
maintained its mysterious reluctance to identify the source of
the first aspect of the right to travel, cited Article IV as the
source of the second aspect, and revisited the oft-criticized
Slaughter-House
Cases
to
unearth
the
Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause as the source of
the third aspect of the right to travel. The right to be free from
discrimination became not just an Equal Protection right, but
also a Privilege or Immunity of national citizenship.113 This
pivot away from the Equal Protection Clause allowed the Court
to identify a “textual” source for the right to travel instead of
relying on its “fundamental” aspect. By anchoring the right to
travel, or in this respect, the freedom from discrimination for
being a “new resident,” to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court could ignore federal
authorization of durational residency requirements and declare
California’s changes to the welfare system unconstitutional.
The resurrection of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause could have been
revolutionary,114 and yet Justice Stevens blunted the impact of
such a ruling by seizing upon dicta from the Slaughter-House
Cases that referred to waterways,115 and kept most of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause dormant.
Despite Saenz’s encompassing rhetoric on the history of
the right to travel, and its outline of the right to interstate
travel’s three separate aspects, several open questions remain.
First, the Saenz court explicitly left open the question of the
textual support for the right of “ingress and egress;”
tantalizingly, Justice Stevens noted that the right “may simply
have been ‘conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.’”116
112.
113.
114.
1999).
115.
116.
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Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
Id. at 502.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Found. Press
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (199).
Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758
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Secondly, the Court never overruled the Shapiro line of cases,
and while in some respect the jurisprudence seemed to settle
(Saenz was the last pronouncement by the Supreme Court on
the right to travel), the right to travel continues to be an
ongoing source of litigation and confusion with the lower
courts. Finally, despite describing the right to travel as an antidiscrimination tool, the Court did not create a workable means
to identify when disparate treatment would rise to the level of
“making residents feel unwelcome” such that it would run afoul
of the freedom to migrate.
F.

The Shift from a Federalist Right to Travel into a Civil
Rights Right to Travel

Prior to the civil rights era, the right to travel had been
decided primarily on a federalism axis, but the right found new
life as a tool to protect the indigent and poor when the Court
decided Shapiro. With Shapiro, the Court leveraged the right
to travel’s status as a universally accepted constitutional right
to prevent the discriminatory treatment of the poor but still
avoided making economic class a protected “suspect”
classification. The Court was eager to invoke the value of
equality, but was not prepared to add the poor to the list of
suspect classification. In order to thread this needle, the Court
deliberately left the origin and textual support for the right to
travel vague and indeterminate. The Court had taken what
was a primarily a structural right and reshaped it into a tool to
protect individuals from discrimination. Shapiro completed the
transformation of the right to travel from a federalism right
into a full-fledged civil rights one. And yet, the transformation
was uncomfortable. The 1970s and 1980s showcased the
Supreme Court’s discomfort with describing the right to
interstate travel as a civil rights issue as the Court took up a
right to travel case each year from 1970 until 1975.117 The
1980s were only slightly less fertile for the right to interstate
(1966)).
117. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty.,
415 U.S. 250 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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travel, seeing three cases taken up by the Supreme Court.118
Until the Saenz decision, only two cases in the 1990s dealt in
part with the right to travel, Bray v. Alexander and Nordlinger
v. Hahn, and in both cases the Court found that the right to
travel was not implicated. As the civil rights era faded, so did
the use of the right to travel. Finding Equal Protection
inadequate on its own, the Court in Saenz attempted to
identify the textual source of the right to travel’s personal right
component. As Laurence Tribe explains, while structural rights
could remain un-enumerated, rights which belonged to
individuals must be located in the text of the Constitution,
which is why the Saenz Court was willing to reach back and
risk resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which had laid mostly dead since the
Slaughter-House Cases.119
At first glance, Saenz appears to repudiate Shapiro’s equal
protection analysis, but the Court never overturned Shapiro,
and the Equal Protection framework for the right to travel
continues to survive. The lower federal courts continue to rely
on Equal Protection analysis when deciding right to travel
cases. For instance, in Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probationers
& Parole,120 the court explained that under Equal Protection
analysis laws that use non-suspect classifications can still be
unconstitutional if they impinge on fundamental rights, with
the right to interstate travel being one of them.121 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court interpreted Saenz as
reaffirming the Shapiro decision and continues to rely on the
Equal Protection Clause when deciding right to travel cases.122
118. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981); Att’y Gen. of New York v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982).
119. TRIBE, supra note 114.
120. Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Probationers & Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2008).
121. Despite the fundamental nature of the right, the Court found that
because the petitioners were under probation, the restriction on the right to
travel was constitutional. Id.
122. Sylvester v. Comm’r of Revenue, 837 N.E.2d 662, 666-67 (Mass.
2005) (“First, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Shapiro v. Thompson, supra
(and, by extension, later related decisions), that the constitutional right to
travel is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, so that a State classification involving a length of residence to
qualify for welfare benefits has the effect of imposing a ‘penalty’ on the right
to travel that is unlawful unless the classification is necessary to advance a
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This interpretation of Saenz is unsurprising, since the Court
repeatedly described the right to travel as protecting against
discriminating treatment. When Justice Stevens equates the
right to travel as “the right to be treated like other citizens of
that State” it is not hard to see why courts continue to rely on
the Equal Protection Clause in deciding right to travel cases.
The right to travel’s long history showcases its many
different functions. It helps prevent interstate conflict, both as
an instrument in Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
and as a form of comity in Article IV’s prohibition against
discrimination against non-residents. And yet, the right to
travel is more than just a structural right; it is a fundamental
right that demands Equal Protection. While its various uses
and history can be frustrating to commentators and jurists
alike, the right to travel plays a crucial role in promoting
national unity and providing a significant bulwark for
individual freedom.
III. Undocumented Status and the Right to Travel
A.

Why Lack of Federal Authorization Does Not Allow States
to Ignore the Right to Travel for Undocumented Migrants

At first glance, the position that the undocumented can
claim a right to travel seems preposterous. How could people
who do not enjoy a legal right to enter or live in the United
States make a claim as to travel within and between the
states? An undocumented migrant’s defining characteristic is
past evasion of immigration procedures or a violation of the
conditions of his or her entry, so how can he or she claim a
right to establish residence? But the syllogism is misplaced for
it assumes that the greater power—to exclude or deport from
the country which belongs to the federal government—can
provide states with the so-called lesser power—to exclude or
deport from an individual state. The difference between state
and federal sovereignty is a crucial factor in understanding
how the right to travel extends to those without federal
authorization.
compelling governmental interest.”).
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When the Supreme Court linked the ability to expel
unwanted migrants to the ability to exclude unwanted people,
it referred to this power as an “inherent and inalienable right
of every sovereign and independent nation.”123 The federal
government’s power to control its borders and the flow of noncitizens within its territories is an expansive one rarely
questioned. The federal government may condition entry into
the United States for several reasons, from restricting
employment,124 to setting durational limits,125 and even to
forcing certain geographic limitations on entry.126 This power to
restrict movement, travel, and migration are all sovereign
powers because they are all related to the ability to choose
membership and identity. The United States of America as a
sovereign nation should have the ability to choose whom to
accept as members of its society, both temporary and
permanent. While the most prominent type of membershipcitizenship-is a hotly contested status and will be discussed
infra, other sorts of membership are no less important.
Temporary tourists are given a membership into the United
States to enjoy the sights and provide both culture and
commerce. Students are given membership into the national
community of universities and colleges to both learn and
contribute scholarship. The federal government inspects
applicants for memberships in the various spheres, and decides
whether or not a person fits the necessary criteria.
Undocumented migrants are people who either lost legal
membership or never applied for such membership from the
federal government of the United States in the first place. This
lack of legal recognition is the source of the federal
government’s power to deport non-citizens, including the
undocumented. Deportation is the effectuation of the choice by
the federal government to deny membership to a person inside
the United States. Whenever the federal government wields
123. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (“rest
upon one foundation, are derived from one source...and are in truth but parts
of one and the same power”).
124. Tourist visas do not allow employment, while student visas may
restrict employment to on-campus positions.
125. Most non-immigrant visas have durational requirements.
126. Border Crossing cards are valid for entry for a geographic area
around the border.
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this power it must necessarily deny a person a variety of
substantive due process rights, such as freedom from restraint,
access to family, and ultimately the freedom to choose one’s
residence. The power of deportation has a profound
consequence on what sort of rights an undocumented person
may assert against the federal government. The federal
government’s greater power to exclude and therefore deport
would necessarily subsume a claim to the right to travel. This
is unsurprising given that, historically, the right to travel is
mostly unconcerned with the exercise of federal power. The
right to travel, along with the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,127 is a powerful reminder that the
individual states have no ability to determine their own
membership. Without the power to deny individuals state
membership, States lack the power to expel the unwanted,
even those without membership granted by the federal
government-the undocumented migrant.
B.

The Right to Travel versus State Sovereignty—the Power to
Choose Membership

The right to travel jurisprudence began with a focus on
movement and commerce. The cases recognized that “ingress”
was to be protected from interference and that commerce would
suffer if state borders restricted not just goods, but people128
However, with Shapiro, the focus shifted away from just
movement to membership and discrimination. Courts no longer
were concerned with states placing barriers to actual
movement such as in Wheeler or Edwards, but started to focus
on how states were choosing which members residing in the
states would get full protection of the law.129 State
discriminatory treatment that affected migration garnered the
attention of the Courts. States were not allowed to deny poor
127. The Citizenship Clause forbids a state from denying state
citizenship to a U.S. citizen who decides to reside within its territories.
128. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870).
129. This focus on membership questions echoes Professor Motomura’s
concerns about the national versus state attempts to decide membership. See
Section I. The right to travel jurisprudence provides the example on what is
an exclusive “national project” the determination of membership that is given
to the federal government and withheld from the states.
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migrants full membership status, even though lack of money
itself was not a protected class. The right to travel evolved into
a right of migration between states premised on equal
treatment.
When the Supreme Court decided Shapiro, it represented
a leap in the evolution of the right to travel. Prior to Shapiro,
Courts were focused on making sure that travel and commerce
were fully protected by denying the individual states the ability
to restrict movement across their borders. But the law at issue
in Shapiro was of a wholly different character. California was
not preventing travelers or businessmen or even federal
officials from entering or doing business within its borders.
Rather, California attempted to restrict the number and type of
persons who could claim membership as California residents
and, by doing so, receive the full benefits of California laws.
While the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause made it
impossible for California to directly deny citizenship in general
to its residents, California’s disparate treatment of new
residents tried to accomplish what a direct barrier could not.
When the Supreme Court struck down the individual
states’ attempt to discriminate against new migrants who were
poor, the right to travel became not just about movement or
travel, but a restriction on how states could use their laws to
affect their own membership. A State cannot implement its
own “immigration” policy, precisely because the states are not
sovereigns. While the direct barriers to movement, such as
entry taxes and criminalization, would clearly implement a
migration policy, the Court beginning in Shapiro recognized
that disparate treatment within the state could accomplish the
same goals as tightened borders.130 Despite the broad powers
each state has to police and regulate its members, it may not
deny membership or withhold the benefits of its laws to people
who choose to live within its borders. This restriction on state
power runs parallel to and in contrast with the Federal
Government power to do exactly what the states cannot.
Federal immigration policy allows the federal government
130. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).This is the same
reasoning that motivated the self-deportation architects who decided that
discriminating against certain people within its borders not only would force
some out, but would discourage others from entering at all.
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to deny a myriad of benefits to those it deems unfit. The federal
government is allowed to enforce its decisions on membership
through its plenary power and most directly by exercising its
deportation power. State governments have no such recourse.
An example of this state disability is borne out by the
Citizenship Clause, which forbids states from having any say
on who is and who is not a citizen of the United States. The
Citizenship Clause not only prevents states from deciding
federal membership, but-importantly-the clause also prohibits
states from defining state citizenship when the person in
question is a natural born citizen. “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”131 While the concept of state citizenship
played an important role in the Antebellum period, modern
states tend to use the term “residents” to define a host of state
membership boundaries precisely because the Fourteenth
Amendment muddled the meaning of state citizenship.132
Federalism plays an important role in preserving the role
of state governments without losing a national character. State
power is enormously broad and often has the most immediate
effect on individuals. And yet, the right to travel significantly
undercuts the sovereignty of individual states. Just as Justice
Scalia and Justice Taney point out, a state does have
significant legitimate interests that are severely hampered
when a state is unable to control its borders and prevent
migration. When California wanted to limit the poor via the
legislation in Edwards and in Shapiro, the goal was not just
prejudice against the poor, but a legitimate concern that an
influx of the poor would threaten their current welfare system
for its current citizens. Maricopa County’s decision to limit free
non-emergency care to established residents was a choice
designed to protect its program from financial ruin.133 As
pressing and legitimate the concerns the individual states had,
the Constitution does not allow the states fix such problems by
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
132. Examples include state taxation, in-state tuition, and the
obligations of jury duty and voting. The possibility that states can define
citizenship to those without federal citizenship will be discussed infra.
133. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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denying residency to people in their particular state.
C.

The Right to Travel Protects Interests Unaffected by a Lack
of Federal Authorization

If states are not allowed to use migration policy as a
solution to various problems, how does this relate to state selfdeportation laws? There are two main reasons why the lack of
federal authorization does not affect the right to travel
analysis. Migration barriers erected by individual states are
generally repugnant to the comity and relations between the
different states, and self-deportation laws are no exception. The
prohibition against states deciding migration policy is an
important tool to prevent conflicts between the states and to
promote national unity.134 The status of the migrants being
protected matters little: the more burdensome or noxious the
group of migrants is, the more important it is to allow the free
flow of migration. Just as setting up tariffs or barriers to the
free flow of goods violates federal unity, so do barriers to the
free flow of people-including the undocumented—between the
states. Secondly, the right to travel is a right of personhood and
not dependent on federal authorization or status. Its
fundamental nature arose from its concern for equality under
the law, a protection that extends to the undocumented.
1. The Right to Travel and Comity Considerations
The comity aspect of the right to travel is relatively
uncontroversial and largely accepted by jurists and
commentators alike. Professor Nzelibe argues that the right to
134. This potential conflict between states convinces Erin Delaney that
the Dormant Commerce Clause, one of the potential anchors to the right to
travel, may be used as a tool to evaluate state self-deportation laws. “In the
Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to State
Laws Regulating Aliens” 82 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1821 (2007). Much of what she
describes as concerns under Dormant Commerce Clause, as applied to
immigration already exists in right to travel analysis. Ultimately, equating
migration directly with commerce may make the direct application of
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence problematic. Regardless, much of
its application can prove useful in deciding how to detect breaches of the right
to travel. See infra Part V.
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travel’s main purpose is “conserving the political and economic
union against provincial state interests.”135 Professor Nzelibe
explains that several clauses in the Constitution, namely
Article IV’s Comity Clause and the Commerce Clause, were
drafted with the idea of promoting a national Union and
reducing interstate conflicts. The right to interstate travel
embodied similar values and should more properly be labeled
as a “free movement” principle rather than an individually
protected right. He describes how the free movement principle,
like Article IV and the Commerce Clause, shared similar
heritages and policy norms-the promotion of a federal unity.136
For Professor Nzelibe, the right to travel, Article IV, and the
Commerce Clause form a trio of “union-conserving norms.”137
Under the free movement principle, a state’s discriminatory
practice should be analyzed by deciding if it poses a “threat to
the underlying norm of promoting federalism” rather than
examining its effects on individuals.138 The free movement
principle is a “surrogate” right, which “can be considered those
interests asserted by the individual against the state to protect
values that are essential to the existence of one union, as
opposed to values that presume there are certain liberties
inherent to the individual upon which the state may not
infringe.”139 The union-preserving role of the right to travel is
independent of any specific individual’s status or ability to
assert rights. The determinative question should be whether
the state’s interference with movement and migration
threatens national unity.

135. Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM. U.
L. REV. 433, 435 (1999).
136. Other scholars such as Professor Richard Collins, have made
similar arguments. Professor Collins focused less on the political union but
rather viewed the Dormant Commerce Clause and the right to travel as
creating a federal common market. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union
as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988).
137. Nzelibe, supra note 135, at 440-41.
138. Id. at 449.
139. Id. at 452.
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2. Self-Deportation Laws as a Threat to Comity Between
States
The list of the amici in the S.B. 1070 case before the
Supreme Court produced few surprises, with one notable
exception. The States of New York, Illinois, Hawaii, Rhode
Island, California, Connecticut, Oregon, Massachusetts,
Maryland and Vermont all joined an amicus brief that argued
that Arizona’s attempt to initiate a state-based immigration
scheme under S.B. 1070 violated federalism. While notable that
these states all argued against their own power to create an
immigration scheme, most of their arguments echoed the
federal government’s concerns around pre-emption. However,
in a section titled “Arizona’s Single-State Removal Policy has
National and International Effects,” the state attorneys general
described the impact of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 on their respective
states.140
State amici began by describing an effect of S.B. 1070,
“[b]ecause Arizona cannot compel the federal government to
remove undocumented residents, S.B. 1070’s provisions have
the primary effect of redirecting undocumented immigrants to
other States.”141 Arizona had argued that its undocumented
population was burdensome, that it led to increases in crime,
and a threat to the fiscal and employment security of the state.
Regardless of whether these fears were founded, the goal of
driving out undocumented immigrants from the state and
diverting them to their neighbors was exactly what the other
state amici objected to. But how exactly does Arizona’s decision
to enact S.B. 1070 affect the other states and would those
effects lead to unconstitutional conflicts?
a. Migration affecting Interstate Commerce
While this concept may seem repugnant to some, the Court
has a long history of equating the migration of people with the

140. Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 21, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No 11182).
141. See id.
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flow of commerce, including the migration of non-citizens.
Many of the Justices in the Passenger Cases rejected the local
taxes by New York and Boston, believing that they would
directly implicate interstate commerce and are therefore
prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause.142 The taxes at
issue in the case were prompted by fears of economic burdens
and payoffs to other states.143 The commerce justification was
again relied upon by a concurring opinion of the Court when it
struck down Nevada’s tax in Crandall, and later once again by
the majority of the Court in Edwards, which tried to prohibit
the migration of poor people into the state. While this
justification fell out of favor later on,144 it has never been
expressly overruled, and as late as 1982, Justice Brennan
approvingly noted this justification in the Zobel decision.
The fact that migration affects commerce does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the right to travel is
housed in the Dormant Commerce Clause, but it does highlight
the havoc that a violation of the right to travel can have on the
federal union.145 When states begin to restrict migration of
people, economic instability follows. The notion that the
migration of people, whether undocumented or poor, affects
commerce is not controversial or even debatable. Human
beings, regardless of their status are principle drivers of
commerce and the economy. This relationship between
migration and commerce is one reason that Professor Delaney
proposed an Article I Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis for
examining state regulation.146 The magnitude and direction of
the economic effects of undocumented immigrants has been a
fiercely debated topic among economists and used by politicians
as justification to pass laws welcoming or restricting non142. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 283.
143. Friedrich Kapp, a state Commissioner of Emigration in the 1870s
wrote, “While New York has to endure nearly all of its evils, the other States
reap most of the benefits of immigration.” FRIEDRICH KAPP, IMMIGRATION AND
THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 157 (The
Nation Press 1870).
144. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999)
145. Even if the right to travel is not housed in the Dormant Commerce
Clause, its analytical framework may be useful in studying immigration
laws.
146. Delaney, supra note 134.
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citizens.147 The laws at issue in the Passenger Cases and Mayor
of New York v. Miln148 are prime examples of state-based
immigration restrictions designed to affect interstate
commerce.149 Similarly, when New York and California
complained to the United States Supreme Court about
Arizona’s
legislation
restricting
migration
of
the
undocumented, they cited economic concerns.
b. Non-commercial Ways that Migration of Non-Citizens
Affects Comity Between States
The effects of controlling interstate migration are not
limited to commercial repercussions. Arizona, as well as other
states with similar laws, such as Georgia and Alabama,
justifies the laws based on non-economic concerns. In its brief
to the United States Supreme Court, Arizona argued “[t]his
flood of unlawful cross-border traffic, and the accompanying
influx of illegal drugs, dangerous criminals and highly
vulnerable persons, have resulted in massive problems for
Arizona’s citizens and government, leaving them to bear a
seriously disproportionate share of the burden of an already
urgent national problem.”150 The Supreme Court’s majority
opinion, even as it struck down most of S.B. 1070, recognized
Arizona’s concerns for law enforcement by citing to a (dubious)
report that estimated a higher criminal proportionality for the
undocumented population in Maricopa County.151
Arizona also expressed concern over the degradation of
public parks and natural resources caused by border crossers.
While the magnitude, cause, and perhaps even the existence of

147. See Gordon H. Hanson, The Economics and Policy of Illegal
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Dec., 2009),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/economics-and-policy-illegalimmigration-united-states.
148. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
149. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 283; Miln, 36 U.S. at 102.
150. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182).
151. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (citing
Steven A. Camarota & Jessica Vaughan, Center for Immigration Studies,
Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Situation 16 (2009)).
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these effects are debatable,152 the stakes are high enough that
if an individual state appears to try and “pass on” those effects
to its neighbors, conflicts can arise. Tellingly, Arizona began its
brief to the Supreme Court by declaring that uneven federal
enforcement in Texas and California had funneled the burden
of undocumented immigration to Arizona.
The stated justifications for SB 1070 in dealing with the
undocumented have a historical precedent. In Edwards, the
Court noted “[t]he State asserts that the huge influx of
[indigent] migrants into California in recent years has resulted
in problems of health, morals, and especially finance, the
proportions of which are staggering.”153 As serious as these
concerns may be, they highlight the degree to which the
possibility of friction can occur. As the Justices ruled in
Edwards, “this phenomenon does not admit of diverse
treatment by the several States. The prohibition against
transporting indigent non-residents into one State is an open
invitation to retaliatory measures, and the burdens upon the
transportation of such persons become cumulative.”154 The
Court goes on to say,
[a]nd [for limitations on state power] none is
more certain than the prohibition against
attempts on the part of any single State to isolate
itself from difficulties common to all of them by
restraining the transportation of persons and
property across its borders. It is frequently the
case that a State might gain a momentary
respite from the pressure of events by the simple
expedient of shutting its gates to the outside
world.155
The Edwards Court quotes Justice Cardozo as saying “[the
Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the

152.
153.
154.
155.

See Hanson, supra note 112, at 8.
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1942).
See id. at 176.
Id. at 173.
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long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division.”156 The right to travel plays a crucial role in creating a
national framework and preventing individual states from
attempting to fix difficult problems by passing them on to other
states.
The passage of S.B. 1070 caused a number of other states,
including Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, and Utah, to pass similar
laws. The year that Arizona passed S.B. 1070, several
newspapers reported that between10 and 20 states were
considering similar bills.157 While this may, at first, appear to
be a way for states to unite, especially as many of the laws
were written by the same authors, this copycat reaction by the
states is an example of retaliatory action. When the Edwards
Court described “retaliatory” action, it depicted a scenario
where other states would react to California’s laws by passing
similar legislation, only harsher.158 The concern was that each
state would continually attempt to drive out indigents by
passing ever more draconian legislation. In passing H.B. 56, a
law described as broader in scope and harsher in application
than Arizona’s S.B. 1070 provision, Alabama took the first step
in creating conflict and chaos among its fellow states.
3. Restriction of Migration of Undocumented Implicates
Federal Power
The federalism aspect of the right to travel is not limited to
“horizontal” federalism, or in other words just comity between
the states, but does have an impact on vertical federalism,
namely the relationship between the federal and state
governments. In Crandall, the Supreme Court explained why
territorial exclusions by states would and could frustrate
156. Id. at 174.
157. See John Miller, Twenty Other States Considering Copying Arizona
Immigration Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2010, 7:13 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/25/twenty-other-statesconsi_n_626095.html; ImmigrationWorks USA, Immigration Reform in Other
States Since Arizona's SB 1070, HISPANICALLY SPEAKING NEWS (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/immigrationnews/details/immigration-reform-in-other-states-after-arizonas-sb-10702605/2703/html.
158. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160. 176 (1942).
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national interests and power. The Court described the varying
seats of federal power, from the centralized to locations far and
wide within the various states, and explained that
[i]n all these [locations the Federal government]
demands the services of its citizens, and is
entitled to bring them to those points from all
quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in
a State to obstruct this right that would not
enable it to defeat the purposes for which the
government was established.159
Restrictions on movement of people dilute and frustrate the
Federal government’s ability to exercise its power, especially in
the realm of immigration and alienage. For example, suppose
that an undocumented man lives in a state that does not have
an immigration court, such as Iowa. If he has an immigration
hearing in Omaha, Nebraska, and Nebraska has strict laws
criminalizing any entries by the undocumented, then the
Federal government’s ability to control immigration would be
threatened by state law. The ability to move between state
borders not only prevents states from in-fighting, but is also
necessary to allow federal power to flow throughout the nation.
Because federal power inheres in its agents and the ability to
exercise power over people, geographical restrictions on people
inevitably obstruct that power.
This type of interference with federal power is not the
same as pre-emption. Pre-emption, like the right to travel, is
an outgrowth of the federalist structure. The superiority of
federal law to state law is an aspect to federalism as much as
the principle of limited powers for the Federal government.
Pre-emption is primarily concerned with the vertical structure
of the government, namely the relationship between a state’s
power and the Federal government’s. As the Arizona Court
explained, pre-emption occurs when the Federal government
has declared exclusive jurisdiction over a field (field preemption), or when state laws and federal laws conflict such

159. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) at 44.
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that it becomes impossible to comply with both.160 State and
local regulation, just like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, can run into preemption issues when dealing with non-citizens. Pre-emption
and the right to travel, even as purely federalist values, are not
identical.
While pre-emption focuses on conflicts between state and
federal laws, the right to travel’s concerns are broader. The
right to travel protects federal power in two primary ways. The
first is to ensure the ability of federal officers and people under
federal authority to move freely across state borders without
interference. State immigration laws do not normally interfere
with federal officers or their ability to freely travel in to and
out of a state. But interference with federal power also occurs
when states restrict the ability of people to petition the federal
government. Self-deportation laws interfere with the ability of
people to entreat the federal government for benefits and
protection. When Arizona’s borders are hostile to any
movement by undocumented people, it is impossible for the
undocumented to petition the federal government for help or
protection that they would otherwise have the ability to do.161
For instance, a young undocumented immigrant, who would be
otherwise eligible for immigration relief, may be living in
Arizona or the neighboring state of New Mexico. If Arizona is
allowed to restrict movement internally or through its borders,
the applicant may never have a chance to file and attain
federal relief without violating Arizona laws restricting the
movement of the undocumented. Even in the modern era,
which relies heavily on electronic medium, the freedom of
movement is often necessary for those who seek the authority
and protection of federal power.162 Any legal restriction on
movement that may hamper the ability to petition for federal
protection undermine federal power and is suspect.

160. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).
161. Crandall’s language does refer to the citizen being able to seek
federal power, but as will be argued infra, this distinction loses its
importance once the courts accept that the undocumented have the right of
access to the court system.
162. While DACA applications are received through the mail, applicants
are expected to get biometrics done at application support centers.
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D. Right to Travel is Not Just a Structural Concern
Describing the right to travel solely in terms of federalism
misses the right’s rich history and the important role that it
plays in defending individual liberty. Justice Taney’s
description defines its purpose as solely structural, and even
Crandall’s invocation of national interest makes note of the
“corollary” right possessed by citizens.163 Article IV, commonly
referred to as the “Comity Clause,” also provides individual
rights, such as those contained in its Privileges and
Immunities Clause.164 Despite Professor Nzelibe’s frustration
with the post-Shapiro line of cases that consistently refer to the
right to travel as an individual right, other scholars have
recognized that the right to travel plays a dual role, protecting
federalism and individual liberty.165 It accomplishes these dual
purposes by preventing states from discriminating against
migrants or travelers, directly and indirectly. By prohibiting
states from engaging in individual migration policies, the right
to travel enhances the federal union; but it also allows people
to exercise choice in where to reside or travel within the United
States. Because the scope and breadth of individual liberties
can oftentimes vary depending on immigration status, it is a
fair question to wonder whether non-citizens, especially the
undocumented, may invoke the right to travel to protect their
own liberty interests.
E.

Equal Protection for the Undocumented
The

right

to

travel

was

a

powerful

tool

against

163. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867) (“But if the
government has these rights on her own account, the citizen also has
correlative rights. He has the right to come to the seat of government to
assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any
business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to
engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its seaports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are
conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the
courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature
independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the
exercise of it.”).
164. See Metzger, supra note 110.
165. Id.
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discriminatory treatment by the individual states long before
the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal
Protection Clause. While the right to travel’s protection is not
as broad in scope of as the Equal Protection Clause, it prevents
states from using invidious classifications to discourage travel
or migration. In the Passenger Cases, Massachusetts and New
York attempted to curtail movement by foreigners and citizens
who were from out-of-state. The tool they used to accomplish
this was a head-tax that created various different
classifications. When California tried to prevent the poor from
migrating to the state, it passed a criminal law preventing the
transportation of a certain class of people: those who were
likely to become indigent. Despite this prior history, it wasn’t
until Shapiro, that the Equal Protection Clause began to take
center stage in protecting the right to travel. The right
certainly existed prior to the Equal Protection Clause, but one
of the key means to preserve the right—prevention of
discrimination wasn’t fully realized until the Shapiro decision.
The right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right such
that any state classification on its exercise must pass strict
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court foreclosed arguments that the
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole does not apply to the
undocumented shortly after the Amendment’s ratification.
Beginning with Yick Wo v. Hopkins,166 non-citizens were able to
seek protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Mathews v. Diaz extended the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process protection to include undocumented
immigrants. 167 However, the Supreme Court did not decide the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause until Texas passed a law
that withheld funding to public schools that educated
undocumented children.
In Plyler v. Doe,168 the Supreme Court settled several
questions. First, the words “person” and “within their
jurisdiction” of the Equal Protection Clause covered
undocumented immigrants. States may not deny Equal
Protection of the law to the undocumented. However, while
166. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
167. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
168. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1983).
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Equal Protection covered the undocumented, its application
remained unclear and ultimately proved to be very narrow.169
Even as Equal Protection’s scope included the
undocumented, important limitations were put into place.
First, the Court decided that undocumented status is not a
“suspect” class, meaning that strict scrutiny would not apply to
classifications based on undocumented status. The Court ruled
that undocumented status was not an immutable characteristic
and instead was the product of a conscious unlawful act.170
Second, the Court ruled that public education is not a
fundamental constitutional right and therefore discriminatory
restriction on access to public education does not have to
survive strict scrutiny analysis.171 The second ruling was as
crucial as the first. If public education is a fundamental right
under Equal Protection, then even if the classification was not
suspect, any restriction would still require examination under
strict scrutiny. Ultimately, the Court ruled the law
unconstitutional under a lesser form of scrutiny. While Plyler
importantly opened the door for Equal Protection claims, it did
so in a very narrow way.172 Immigration status was not a
suspect classification requiring protection, even as the scope of
Equal Protection does include undocumented people. The
unanswered question left by Plyler is what would happen if a
state attempted to discriminate against the undocumented by
denying a “fundamental” right previously recognized as
protected under the Equal Protection Clause?
The list of Equal Protection fundamental rights is not a
long one. The Supreme Court has protected parental rights,173
the right to have one’s vote counted,174 the First Amendment,175
169. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723 (2010).
170. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
171. Id. at 223 (“Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not
justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which
education is provided to its population.”).
172. See Motomura, supra note 169, at 1731-32 (“[The Plyler Court]
relied so heavily on the involvement of children and education that no court
has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized migrants
outside the context of K-12 public education.”).
173. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
174. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)(If a fundamental right under the
Equal Protection Clause however is the requirement to have one’s vote count,
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the right against sterilization (or reproduction),176 the right to
contraception177 and, most relevant to this discussion, the right
to interstate travel.178 While both Equal Protection and
substantive due process both use the term “fundamental” as
pertaining to rights, the uses are very different in application.
As Justice Stewart writes in response to Justice Harlan’s
dissenting opinion in Shapiro, in deciding a fundamental right
under Equal Protection, the Court “does not ‘pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as ‘‘fundamental”, and
give them added protection.’ To the contrary, the Court simply
recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and
gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution
itself demands.”179 Unlike substantive due process, which may
be used to find un-enumerated rights under the guise of
“liberty”, an Equal Protection fundamental right must already
enjoy explicit constitutional protection.
When courts described the right to travel as an individual
right, they often referred to terms such as liberty180 and
freedom of movement. In the context of international and intrastate travel181 the courts explicitly grounded the right as a
liberty interest. Restrictions on the ability to travel into and
out of a state’s territory, or restrictions on where to choose to
live, are intrinsically tied to liberty and another reason why it
how could a non-citizen be afforded such protection when they can be
excluded from suffrage altogether? The right under Bush v. Gore does not
require universal suffrage; rather it requires that once a person votes, it must
be counted equally to all the other votes. And because non-citizens may be
given suffrage and have throughout the nation’s history, it stands to reason
that if they were allowed to vote, their vote must be counted equally.).
175. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
176. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (Though the Court did
not need to decide that the right to contraceptives was a fundamental right
as it struck the restriction under rational basis, the Court strongly indicated
that it would have found Griswold’s prohibition as a fundamental right.).
178. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
179. See id. at 642.
180. It is important to note, that while “liberty” can have broad
meanings, the references to the right to travel refer to a narrower definition
concerning freedom from physical confinement.
181. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002); Lutz v.
City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857
(2001).
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is a fundamental right that covers all people, including the
undocumented.
IV. Citizenship and the Right to Travel
A careful reader of the right to travel cases will note that
the word “citizen” appears throughout the Supreme Court’s
decisions. The right to travel’s textual foundations include the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; rights which non-citizens and the undocumented
enjoy. However, the Court has also pointed to other textual
foundations of the right: the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, both of which explicitly contain the
term “citizens” and not the term “persons.” The latter status is
one that an undocumented migrant may make a claim to, while
the former status is out of reach. Moreover, Justice Taney, one
of the first jurists to define the right to travel, explicitly denied
this right to non-citizens and described it as a right unique to
federal citizens.182 How can non-citizens, particularly the
undocumented, be able to invoke a right that has been
described as a “privilege or immunity of citizenship?”
A.

The Citizenship Divide

Prior to the Court’s decision in Saenz, the right to travel as
an exclusive citizenship right was merely a suggestion gleaned
from the repeated use of the word “citizen” and various dicta
from dissenting and concurring opinions. When presented with
the question directly, the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Richardson183 declined to decide the issue and instead relied
upon the Equal Protection Clause. The perception of the right
to travel changed dramatically after Saenz described the
textual foundations as partially residing in the Comity Clause
of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The suggestion of citizenship
182. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 283.
183. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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exclusivity transformed into an assumption. And yet, the Court
never decided that the right to travel’s scope was limited to
citizens or citizenship; California’s welfare scheme did not
depend on the citizenship status of any of the incoming
migrants. The revival of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause was a strategic choice,
designed to address California’s attempt to accomplish
indirectly what the states in Shapiro could not do directly.
Even assuming that Saenz’s identification of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a significant source of the right to travel
is correct, it doesn’t decide the scope of the right to travel’s
protection. The paucity of jurisprudence around the Privileges
or Immunities Clause muddies the issue, and surprisingly
enough, the Supreme Court has not expressly withheld a
privilege or immunity of citizenship from non-citizens. An
examination of constitutional citizenship, the historical origins
of the right to travel, and finally the right’s expansion under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause reveals
that, regardless of its textual source, the right to travel
protects non-citizens in the interior of the United States.
Both Article IV’s “Privileges and Immunities” Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Privileges or Immunities
Clause” contain the term “citizen”, which naturally leads to the
assumption that non-citizen migrants, especially the
undocumented, are outside of the respective clauses’ coverage.
Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, noted that Article
IV’s clause would naturally be read to exclude non-citizens.184
But before this next logical step can be taken, John Hart Ely’s
warning about the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
should be heeded:
“I certainly agree that we should defer to clear
constitutional language: for one thing it is the
best possible evidence of purpose. But when the
usual reading is out of accord with what we are
quite certain was the purpose, we owe it to the
Framers and ourselves at least to take a second

184. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 (1982).
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look at the language.”185
The fact that both clauses contain the term “citizen” does not
necessarily limit or define the scope of the clauses’ protection.
186

The claim that the right to travel is an exclusive right for
citizens faces several hurdles. First, citizens have few exclusive
constitutional protections. 187 One scholar even deemed
citizenship irrelevant in constitutional law.188 Second, the
historical underpinnings of the right to travel extended to noncitizens and “inhabitants.” The interweaving of “citizenship”
and the right to travel was a strategy motivated by racial
animus and fear of movement by free black men into slave
states. And finally, even if the right to travel began as a
privilege or immunity of citizenship, once it was given
fundamental status under the Equal Protection Clause it would
necessarily extend to non-citizens and the undocumented.
B.

The Thinness of Citizenship Rights

When Alexander Bickel wrote that citizenship was “not
important,” he did so with a specific worry in mind. As he
explained, “Citizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a
theory. No matter what safeguards it may be equipped with, it
is at best something that was given, and given to some and not
to others, and it can be taken away.”189 To him, the grounding
of rights and constitutional protection based on the legal status
of citizenship was dangerous and far less reliable than
understanding that rights were dependent on “personhood.” He
185. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 25(1980).
186. An example of how the term “citizen” in the Constitution may
extend to non-citizens can be seen in the context of Article III’s diversity
jurisdiction requirement, which has been interpreted to include residents of a
state who are not federal citizens. Similarly, despite references to “state
citizenship,” citizens of Puerto Rico also enjoy Article IV protection.
187. See Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship through the Prism of
Alienage, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 1285, 1314 (2002)
188. Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15
Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (1973).
189. Id. at 387.
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warned that “it always will be easier, to think of someone as a
noncitizen than to decide that he is a nonperson . . . .”190
Indeed, he was particularly concerned that a citizen-based
rights theory would lead us to “a search for reciprocity and
symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights and
obligations,” which in turn would lead to a theory of rights
dependent on consent and contract.191 This warning is
particularly prescient when considering the fate of
constitutional protection for undocumented migrants in the
United States.192 Constitutional jurisprudence has largely
heeded Bickel’s concerns and disfavors making constitutional
protection hinge on citizenship.
Kurt T. Lash’s book The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, makes two
convincing arguments that seriously questions the role of the
right to travel as a “citizenship” right. First and foremost,
despite the common reading of Coryfeld that had included the
right to travel as a right belonging to Article IV, Professor Lash
demonstrated that ante-bellum common understanding of
Coryfeld was much more limited. Despites its expansive dicta,
Coryfeld and the other antebellum decisions on Article IV
confirm an understanding that the “privileges and immunities”
of citizenship did not refer to national or even fundamental
rights, but rather only rights expressively protected by states
to their own citizens.193 He also defended against the notion
that the 14th Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause
refers to unenumerated rights and instead articulates how the
drafters and common understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities clause during its passage refers to enumerated
federal rights such as the first eight amendments, or the Bill of
Rights. He specifically criticizes the Saenz court’s incorporation
of the right to travel into the privileges or immunities clause.194
Suffice to say, despite the Court’s nearly offhand description of
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM.
J. INT’L. L. 694 (2011).
193. Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and
Immunities of Citizenship, Cambridge University Press 2014, p. 23-37, 166167.
194. Id. at 263 n.120.
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the right to travel as a ‘citizenship’ right, there is considerable
doubt whether such descriptions hold any analytical or even
historical weight.
A survey of constitutional rights explicitly reserved for
those who have the status of citizenship yields a short list. If
one includes unenumerated rights under Article IV or the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
the list gets considerably larger, but difficulties arise in
deciding when an un-enumerated right should be reserved for
citizens rather than for people in general. The Constitution
requires certain office holders to be United States citizens, such
as the President and Members of Congress, but notably does
not require members of the Judiciary to be United States
citizens. And while the public may consider suffrage itself a
uniquely held right of citizens, it was denied to a large
percentage of citizens, namely women, until relatively late in
the history of the Constitution,195 and continues to be denied to
minors and felons from certain states. Additionally, suffrage
was occasionally given to non-citizens, even before the forming
of the Republic and as a practice continued sporadically
throughout the states.196 Non-citizens—even undocumented
immigrants—may bring suit in state and federal courts, a
privilege in common law that was exclusive to citizens.197
Deciphering what constitutes a “citizenship” right exclusive to

195. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (suffrage is not a
privilege or immunity of citizenship). Professor Amar argues that the
suffrage right already existed for women prior to the Nineteenth
Amendment, but that the amendment merely required its recognition. And
yet, it is undeniable that non-landowners could not vote for many years, and
that minor citizens and certain felons may also be denied the ability to vote.
Notably most challenges to restrictions on voting invoke the Equal Protection
Clause, i.e. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
196. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,
Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1391 (1993). Recently the City of New York is considering reviving this
practice,
see
NEW
YORK
CITY
COUNCIL,
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=803591&GUID=365
2CB45-9436-4D4F-ADE3-E17CE8A8AF28&Options=&Search=.
197. Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975); Montoya v.
Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Janusis v.
Long, 188 N.E. 228 (Mass. 1933); Catalanotto v. Palazzolo, 259 N.Y.S.2d 473
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
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citizens is not an easy task.198 It gets more confusing when
trying to differentiate a separate question of when citizens can
be treated differently than non-citizens. When are state and
federal laws allowed to benefit citizens over non-citizens can
muddle the question of what rights citizens have that noncitizens do not.
The Supreme Court has authorized laws that discriminate
against non-citizens in terms of employment,199 land
ownership,200 welfare benefits,201 and holding public office. But
while disparate treatment is authorized, this is not the same as
designating underlying benefits as constitutional rights
exclusive to citizens. It may be constitutional to deny a noncitizen the ability to receive welfare benefits, but it does not
follow that welfare benefits are an exclusive right for citizens.
Constitutionally permitted disparate treatment of non-citizens
does not in and of itself indicate an underlying exclusive right
of citizens.202 Citizenship status, outside of the “right” to hold
certain federal offices, has not been a determinative factor in
deciding most, if any, constitutional protections.203 Despite
Justice Warren’s insistence that citizenship is a “status, which
alone assures the full enjoyment of the precious rights
conferred by our Constitution,” this has rarely been the case.204
If the right to travel were a constitutional right exclusive to
United States citizens, it would be a rare creature.205
198. One such privilege which is not explicitly listed in the Constitution,
may include the ability to invoke the protection of the nation in international
disputes or when outside the territory of the United States.
199. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
200. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
201. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
202. This is especially true when considering the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause, which covers non-citizens and undocumented migrants
alike.
203. The recent controversy over the use of drones to kill U.S. Citizens
on both enemy and domestic soil without a trial coupled with Senator McCain
and Graham’s insistence that the Boston Marathon Bombers be denied
Miranda warnings helps illustrate the decreased importance of citizenship
and constitutional protection. In the Guantanamo cases, the Government
pushed to use citizenship status as a dividing line for habeas coverage, but
the Court ultimately rejected this bright line rule.
204. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1957) (Warren, J.,
dissenting).
205. Perhaps the best example of an affirmative right enjoyed by United
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The small weight given to citizenship status was seen early
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
jurisprudence when the Court decided the Slaughter-House
Cases. The Slaughter-House Court placed the “Privileges or
Immunities” phrase into a narrow box where it has been
invoked rarely and, in the words of Professor Tribe, has been
an “underutilized constitutional provision if ever there was
one.” 206 Modern scholars such as Akil Reed Amar and Michael
Kent Curtis have echoed previous scholars like Charles Black
and Phillip Kurland who have rejected the Slaughter-House
holding and instead attempted to revitalize citizenship as the
anchor for constitutional protection by resurrecting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.207 Scholars and occasionally jurists have criticized
the road not taken and considered the elevation of the Due
Process Clause and the evisceration of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a mistake of constitutional
jurisprudence.208 And yet, this revival of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause comes with a price, for the Clause
specifically lists “citizens” under its protection, while many of
the substantive rights listed under the Bill of Rights list
“person” or “people” as the scope of protection.209 For Amar, the
exclusion of non-citizens was not a large concern and he
considered them protected adequately by procedural
fairness.210 Other scholars, such as Charles Black, Jr. worried
States citizens exclusively is the right to avoid deportation.
206. TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1325.
207. CHARLES LUND BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 33-66 (1969); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical
Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after Death: The Privileges or Immunities of
Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000); Philip B. Kurland,
The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at Last?,” 1972
WASH. U.L. REV. 405 (1972).
208. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY, 161-62 (2012) (arguing that the
incorporation doctrine was put off track by the Slaughter-House Cases);
TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1317; and see Kurland, supra note 207, at 406.
209. See Phillip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 61 (2011).
210. Amar argues that the separate usage of “citizen” compared to
“person” is a distinction between substantive rights and rights of procedural
fairness. See Akhil Reed Amar, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, 388
(2006).

59

2014]

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

873

about excluding non-citizens but argued that a strong preemption doctrine could generally protect against state
encroachment on protected rights.211 Until Saenz came along,
the Slaughter-House Cases made the list of citizen privileges or
immunities an exceedingly small list. And yet, the impact of
Saenz was hardly felt outside of residency restrictions.212
C.

The Right to Travel’s Origins Included Residents and
Inhabitants

The lineage of the right to travel can be traced prior to the
Constitution and was explicitly protected by Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation. Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation referenced the privileges and rights of citizens
and yet, it bestowed them upon all of the “free inhabitants” of
the various states. Moreover, when referencing the right to
ingress and egress, Article IV explicitly gave this right to the
“people” and did not restrict it to citizens.213 The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the act that created territorial governments
held by the United States and was part of the “Organic” law of
rights, also had a provision that protected “travel.” The
Ordinance made the navigable waters and the “carrying places”
into “common highways” that were “forever free” to
“inhabitants of the said territory”, “citizens of the United
States”, and “those [citizens] of any other States that may be

211. See BLACK, supra note 207.
212. See Lawrence Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future—or Reveal the Structure of the
Present, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110 (1999).
213. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, ART. IV, para. 1. (“The better
to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of
these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be
entitled to all privileges or immunities of free citizens in the several states;
and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from
any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restriction shall not
extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state, to
any other state, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no
imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any state, on the property of
the united states, or either of them.”).
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admitted.”214 The Northwest Ordinance’s declaration of the
scope and protection for travel should not be underestimated.
The Ordinance existed prior to the Constitution’s own
ratification and predated the Bill of Rights. It was
instrumental in defining the scope and, perhaps, coverage of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the
Constitution and later the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.215 The explicit language of the
Articles of Confederation and the Northwest Ordinance was
not limited to citizens and extended to “people”, and
“inhabitants” of the territories of the states at issue. The
reference to “inhabitants” instead of “citizens” was not idle or
written without contemplation of citizenship as both
documents explicitly also used the citizen term in other areas.
While historical examples of non-citizens claiming the right to
travel may be lacking, there have been few express denials to
non-citizens either.216
214. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LV-LVII.
(“The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and
the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever
free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the
United States, and those of any other States that may be admitted into the
confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor.” The separation
between “citizens of the United States” and “those of any other States”, is a
curious one as the phrasing during a period where national citizenship had
not been explicitly defined.).
215. See Matthew J. Hegreness, An Organic Law Theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights,
Privileges or Immunities, 120 YALE L. J. 1820 (2011).
216. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971), which
expressly left open the question of whether non-citizens could claim a right to
travel. (“While many of the Court's opinions do speak in terms of the right of
‘citizens’ to travel, the source of the constitutional right to travel has never
been ascribed to any particular constitutional provision.”). See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
758-59 (1966). The Court has never decided whether the right applies
specifically to aliens, and it is unnecessary to reach that question here.”); But
see, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
word "Citizens" suggests that the Clause also excludes aliens. See, e. g.,
id., at 177 (dictum); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-33, p. 411, n.
18 (1978). Any prohibition of discrimination aimed at aliens or corporations
must derive from other constitutional provisions.”); Doe v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374-75 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (denying claim based
on undocumented status, but also assuming that if there was a
“fundamental” right to travel that an undocumented migrant possessed, it
would not prevent restrictions on driver’s licenses).
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D. The Second Missouri Compromise and the Question of
State Citizenship
The best example of Alexander Bickel’s worries about the
impermanence and discretionary nature of citizenship is the
fate of free African-American men prior to the Civil War. The
Dred Scott decision and Justice Taney’s attempt to withhold
citizenship from African-American men based on their race
illustrates the danger of using “citizenship” rather than
personhood as an anchor for constitutional protection.217 The
underlying logic of Justice Taney’s infamous Dred Scott ruling
can be found in an early watershed moment of the antebellum
period; Missouri’s admittance into the Union as a State. The
Missouri
Compromise,
whereby
Missouri
became
a
slaveholding state after an agreement was reached on how to
handle the Louisiana Territories is well-known American
history. What is less-known is one of the first examples of a
State’s attempt to exclude people from its territories, the
Missouri Constitution of 1820, which led to the Second
Missouri Compromise.
On February 18, 1820, the United States Senate agreed to
allow Missouri into the union after it held a constitutional
convention and presented to Congress a state constitution.218
The presented state constitution, however, contained a clause
that required the Missouri legislation to pass laws to “prevent
free negroes and mulattoes from coming to, and settling in, this
state, under any pretext whatsoever.”219 The attempt to exclude
free African-Americans and mulattoes caused an uproar in the
divided Senate. One group of senators condemned the provision
as unconstitutional and clearly “abhorrent” to the Federal
Constitution; others either saw no such conflict, or preferred
that the judiciary decide the issue. Eventually, a compromise
was reached where Missouri’s Constitution was accepted with a

217. Obviously the expansive aspect of birthright citizenship from the
Citizenship Clause plays an important role, but it only serves to hide the fact
that Citizenship is a legal construct while personhood is not. A legal
construct, even if constitutionally defined requires legal mechanism for
support. Personhood does not.
218. Missouri Enabling Act, ch. 22, §§1, 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820).
219. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 26.
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strange caveat attached.220 Unfortunately, the agreed-to
condition and the language used only served to create more
confusion and eventually lead to the infamous Dred Scott
decision.
The Senate debated over the proposed Missouri
Constitution centered on a variety of axis, but only two themes
played an important role in this discussion. First, detractors of
the proposed Constitution worried that it could exclude federal
soldiers from entering Missouri to claim land due to them.221
The Union Army famously had a large number of conscripts
who were foreign born and non-citizens.222 By giving the
example of U.S. soldiers as part of the excludable class, the
Senators invoked concerns over federal power, as soldiers were
given title and rights to land and if Missouri excluded them,
then the federal power and promise would be threatened.
The second important theme became the exclusion of free
blacks and mulattoes who some considered citizens of the nonslave owning states.223 Did Article IV of the United States
Constitution, which guarantees privileges and immunities to
citizens of other states, conflict with Missouri’s attempts to
exclude free blacks and mulattoes?
The contours of state citizenship were undefined during
this period, and the Senate heard arguments that cast

220. Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645. (“[T]he offending MO
constitutional clause] shall never be construed to authorize the passage of
any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any
citizen, of either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the
enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is
entitled under the Constitution of the United States.”)
221. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (1820) (“Even if soldiers of the United
States, people of this proscribed class cannot enter Missouri without violating
the constitution of the State.”) Id. at 86. (“Sir, you not only exclude these
citizens from their Constitutional ‘privileges and immunities,’ but also your
soldiers of color, to whom you have given patents for land.”) Senator Holmes
had tried to argue that U.S. soldiers were naturally exempted from the
Missouri Constitution’s prohibition because the offending article did not use
the word “all.”
222. ELLA LONN, FOREIGNERS IN THE UNION ARMY AND NAVY (La. State
Univ. Press, 1951).
223. See Hamburger, supra note 209 (for a discussion of how the Second
Missouri Compromise shifted the argument of whether free blacks were
citizens based on the arguments supporting and denouncing Missouri’s
proposed Constitution.); 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 86 (1820).
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citizenship as a synonym with residence,224 a membership
defined by the several states, and for some a status dependent
on a set of rights.225 No agreement on state citizenship was
agreed upon and the proposed Missouri Constitution was
eventually accepted with a concession that it would not be used
to pass laws that would prevent any citizen of any of the states
from
privileges
and
immunities
protected
by
the
Constitution.226 Essentially, the debate over the status of free
blacks was punted to another time (and came to a head with
Dred Scott) and left open whether the right to travel hinged
upon state citizenship. While Missouri detractors assumed that
at the very least citizens could not be denied the right to travel,
they did not concede that only citizens would be protected.227
Meanwhile, Missouri’s supporters viewed citizenship as
something inherently unavailable to black people and thus
were not able to avail themselves of either the privileges or the
immunities of state citizenship, including the right to travel.228
E.

State Citizenship and its Continual Importance

Eventually the Fourteenth Amendment and its Citizenship
Clause decreased emphasis on state citizenship and its role in
protecting constitutional rights. And yet, Article IV protections
remain a vibrant area of constitutional law.229 While the
question of what rights fall under its protections garner plenty
of attention, courts have not paid much attention to what
constitutes state citizenship for constitutional purposes other
than to rely on domicile or residence.230 This is unsurprising as
224. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 93 (1820).
225. Id. at 87.
226. Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645. (“[The offending MO constitutional
clause] shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that
no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen, of either of
the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the
privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the
Constitution of the United States.”)
227. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 48 (1820).
228. One Senator tried to argue that the right of ingress was not
included as a privilege and immunity of citizenship. See Remarks by Senator
Holmes, 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 85 (1820).
229. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709 (2013).
230. See Pannil v. Roanoke Times Co., 252 F. 910 (W.D. Va. 1918)
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the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause forbids states
from denying citizenship to any United States citizen who
decides to reside in a particular state. But it does leave some
intriguing questions open, as some states have begun to
recognize residency not just for lawful permanent residents,
but also for the undocumented.231 Even though states cannot
deny citizenship to federal citizens residing in their territory,
there is no textual restriction on states granting citizenship to
residents who are not U.S. citizens.232 When a state grants
residency to a United States citizen, it automatically by
constitutional mandate grants state citizenship. But what
happens when a state grants residency to non-citizens, even
the undocumented? The Second Missouri Compromise and the
existence of a state citizenship distinct from federal
citizenship233 leaves open the possibility that foreign born state
residents could gain the benefit of state citizenship, even if
they are denied federal citizenship. Would the granting of
certain rights create citizenship as the senators supporting
Missouri had argued? Or would a status or membership need to
be explicitly granted before certain rights would be recognized?
F.

Aliens Who can Claim Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens

Linda Bosniak in The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of
Contemporary Membership coined the phrase, “alien citizen,”
as a radical response to the attacks on non-citizens’ ability to
(discussing when a person may lose their state citizenship when they had no
intent to travel back there).
231. There are many examples that are relevant, from the granting of
in-state tuition to undocumented students to giving driver’s licenses to the
undocumented and most recently California’s decision to allow undocumented
resident to practice law; Emily Green, Calif. Law Allows Undocumented
Immigrants To Practice Law, NPR (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:25 AM)
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/08/230320902/calif-law-allows-undocumentedimmigrants-to-practice-law.
232. In New York a bill designed to do just that, is titled “New York is
Home Bill” see http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-16/in-newyork-a-bill-to-grant-undocumented-immigrants-state-citizenship
233. See Hough v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse De Russie, 231 F.
341, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (“One may be a citizen of the United States, and yet
not be a citizen of any state.”).
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claim protection under the Constitution. Professor Bosniak
argued that a movement towards the Citizenship Clause as a
source of rights does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of
non-citizens from substantive constitutional protections.
Citizenship, according to Professor Bosniak, is not a
unitary or discrete term, but rather a bifurcated one.
Citizenship can refer to status, in effect a definition of a certain
type of membership, or it may refer to a set of baseline
substantive rights.234 Bosniak’s divide, the status of citizenship
versus the rights of citizenship, was an outgrowth of some prior
scholarly work from the 1970s. She quotes John Hart Ely, who
wrote, “there is a set of entitlements, ‘the Privileges or
Immunities of citizens of the United States,’ which states are
not to deny to anyone.”235 Ely later clarifies this as meaning
that the Privileges or Immunities of United States citizens only
defines the rights, rather than defining the people who hold
them.236 Ely and later Bosniak argued that the term “citizen”
with respect to the rights guaranteed by the clause could cover
aliens as well as “status” citizens. This reading of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause finds some support in an influential
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV. Justice Washington described the rights under that
clause as, “in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments.”237 Aside from the right
to travel, Justice Washington also referred to the right of equal
taxation, the right to own land, and finally the right to sue in
court.238 These separate rights described as privileges and
234. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 14 (2008).
235. Id.
236. See id. at 90 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 83 (1980)).
237. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (no. 3,230).
238. Justice Washington’s reference to the fundamental nature of the
rights and how they may be enjoyed by all citizens of all free governments
leaves open the question of whether the United States, or the individual
states are required to protect the rights of citizens of other nations. Because
Justice Washington was describing how states must honor the fundamental
rights of citizens of other states, it may be an easy jump to consider whether
citizens of other nations should be included as well. However as Professor
Lash has shown, and later the treatment by the Wheeler court, the listing of
the rights may be a descriptive of rights already protected by states, rather
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immunities of citizenship have been extended to non-citizens in
various contexts already. While the right to own land has
historically been dependent on legislative largess, the ability to
sue in court has not so far been depended on a legislative act of
consent.
While Ely was willing to interpret the Privileges or
Immunities Clause outside of the text, he was still missing a
manner in which to include non-citizens under its protection.
Kenneth Karst provided a way to bridge the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to non-citizens by way of the Equal
Protection Clause. In 1977, Professor Karst wrote the foreword
for the November Harvard Law Review where he made a bold
attempt to find the underpinnings of substantive equal
protection.239 He proposed that Equal Protection meant ‘equal
citizenship.’ He defined equal citizenship as a set of principles,
which “presumptively forbids the organized society to treat an
individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste
or as a nonparticipant.”240 The reason Karst used “citizenship”
as a starting point, rather than personhood, revealed itself
when he described the role a citizen plays; a “citizen is a
participant, a member of a moral community who counts for
something in the community’s decision making processes.”241
But most importantly, as Professor Bosniak points out, Karst’s
use of the word “citizen” does not refer to the status of
citizenry, but rather to the set of obligations that a nation has
to its members.242 Karst’s citizenship referred to a baseline of
substantive rights, one which guaranteed certain obligations of
government over its members.
Karst provided two main reasons why equal citizenship
principles should be housed in the Equal Protection Clause
rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause. First, he
than a list of rights that states must protect. Regardless the expansion to
include non-citizens has already begun with several rights on Justice
Washington’s list.
239. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
240. Id. at 6.
241. See id. at 8.
242. Id. at 5 (Karst himself downplays citizenship as a mere legal status:
“Citizenship, in its narrowest sense, is a legal status. . . . So viewed,
citizenship is a constitutional trifle . . . .”). Id.
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believed that the development of jurisprudence under Equal
Protection created a solid foundation and provided modern
judges with guidance on how to apply those principles.
Secondly, he believed that the equal citizenship principle
extends to non-status citizens. His argument on its
applicability to non-citizens boiled down to the “broader
principle of equal citizenship extends its core values to
noncitizens, because for most purposes they are members of
our society.”243 He goes on to note the strangeness of the term
by noting, “[i]f it is paradoxical to suggest that a citizenship
principle protects aliens, the paradox is one of rhetoric, not
substance.”244 And yet, this transference of equal “citizenship”
poses some severe problems.
Lawrence Tribe described the Equal Protection Clause
solution forwarded by Professor Karst, but was skeptical that
“the Equal Protection Clause extended all the rights of national
citizenship to aliens.”245 Historically aliens were treated
differently than citizens, even with respect to the Equal
Protection Clause, a result which Tribe found rational as
“aliens and citizens may simply not be similarly situated.”246
Linda Bosniak was also skeptical of Professor Karst’s
wholesale use of the Equal Protection Clause. While she agreed
with the focal point of rights should be on personhood, she
argued that the concept of citizenship also extends to creating a
“hard shell” of “national exclusivity and closure.” Citizenship
doesn’t just describe rights, but also membership of a nation,
which must inherently be exclusive. In order for citizenship to
define membership and create boundaries, there must be some
division between citizens and non-citizens for otherwise there
is no limiting principle. In other words, “. . . although equal
citizenship requires rights for everyone, it also tolerates, and
perhaps even demands, the legal exclusion of certain
territorially present non-nationals for some purposes . . . .”247
Karst himself tried to identify the rights denied to non-citizens
under citizenship by declaring that insofar the United States is
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
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Id. at 46.
TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1375.
Id.
BOSNIAK, supra note 234, at 100.
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a “political” community, then perhaps political rights may
properly be denied to non-citizens. And yet, this formulation is
vague and laden with value judgments.248
Commentators
have
used
descriptors
such
as
“personhood”, “membership” or “political” as a means to decide
which rights are properly denied to non-citizens and which
ones should be included. And yet these descriptions are difficult
to distinguish from value judgments about citizenship in
general. For example, Amy Motomura argued that non-citizens
should be allowed to sit on juries and the New York Council
debated extending voting privileges to non-citizens. These
modern arguments mirror the fundamental question of
citizenship itself; representation and membership for those
affected. As Professor Tirres has shown, there had been a long
history of restrictions on land ownership for non-citizens, and
yet this was based on a different political concept of
sovereignty.249 While many alien land laws are still on the
books, Professor Tirres and others have argued that their
existence should be considered outdated precisely because the
American concept of sovereignty has shifted. What exactly
qualifies as a “political” right if suffrage does not, and land
ownership may? If a right has already been extended by the
Equal Protection Clause, then it would stand to reason that it
could be extended to non-citizens using the same mechanism.
G. The Equal Protection Clause Expanded the Scope of the
Right to Travel
The history and application of the right to travel mirrors
Professor Karst’s view on “citizenship” rights that can be
extended through the Equal Protection Clause. Under
Professor Karst’s view, a privilege or immunity of citizenship
248. Both Tribe and Karst mention suffrage as an example that could be
denied to non-citizens, but as explained earlier suffrage is not a privilege or
immunity protected by the 14th Amendment’s Privilege or Immunities
Clause.
249. Allison B. Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights
and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77, 91(2012) (“Land was granted in
exchange for allegiance, including the obligation to provide military
protection for the kind or queen and by extension, the lord. Property was thus
a key determinant of allegiance and loyalty.”).
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could be granted to a non-citizen by applying the Equal
Protection Clause. Or as Tribe described “the Equal Protection
Clause, so the argument goes, by prohibiting discrimination in
legal rights among all persons-citizens and persons alike-would
. . . secure the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States’ to all persons within the jurisdiction of a
particular state.”250 While it may stretch Equal Protection too
far to extend all privileges or immunities to non-citizens,
particular attention should be paid to those privileges or
immunities that have already been made subject to Equal
Protection analysis as a “fundamental” right. The right to
travel is one such privilege or immunity.
When the Court in Shapiro decided that the right to travel
prevented California and other states from denying welfare
benefits, it did so by applying the Equal Protection Clause. And
yet, the Court did not try and create a suspect classification for
the poor, or those who needed public benefits; instead the
Court ruled that residency classifications were unconstitutional
because it burdened a “fundamental right—the “right to
travel.” The Court was reluctant during the Shapiro case to
explain the textual foundations of the right to travel, and yet
nevertheless “recognized that the nature of our Federal Union
and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length
and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules or
regulations . . . .”251 By recognizing the fundamental right,
without having to anchor it, the Court was able to find a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause without relying on the
underlying explicit constitutional authority. This was
important, for while the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision
provided for power of enforcement against the states, other
constitutional rights may or may not have been applicable
against the states at all. Incorporation of substantive rights
were (and still are) controlled by references to “due process,” a
phrase that had to be separately weighed. Shapiro’s endaround was used earlier by United States v. Guest when the
Court ruled that the federal conspiracy statute covered

250. TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1325.
251. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
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attempts to interfere with the right to travel by private actors
because of the right’s fundamental nature.252 The extension of
the right to travel through the Equal Protection Clause was
key. In doing so, the Court signaled that the right to travel was
of a fundamental nature such that it should be enjoyed by all
persons and not limited to its original ancestry as a citizenship
right.
The framework described by Kenneth Karst can be applied
to the jurisprudence of the right to travel.253 Once a privilege or
immunity of citizenship has been extended by use of the Equal
Protection Clause a strong presumption should be assumed
that it should become applicable to all persons, including noncitizens. Notably254 Equal Protection does not completely
prevent a state from denying the right to travel, or other
fundamental rights to a person, but it does mandate that such
a denial survive strict scrutiny.
V.

Self-Deportation Laws and the Right to Travel

Establishing that states have little ability to restrict
migration, because of concerns of comity and equal protection is
a starting point. Despite various state legislatures making
their intentions of restricting migration clear and prominent,
the implementation of the policy requires examination.255
When does a law that regulates non-citizens become a law that
attempts to drive them out of the state or prevent their entry?
At what point does a law regulating activity of non-citizens
under a state’s police power become one that restricts
252. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
253. Justice Brennan in the DeSoto and Zobel cases explicitly referred to
principles of equal citizenship perhaps in a nod to Professor Karst’s
arguments.
254. While the Court has also recognized suffrage as a fundamental
right protected by the Equal Protection Clause, the reasoning here does not
force the extension of suffrage to non-citizens, an unintuitive and for many an
unacceptable result. Suffrage is of a fundamentally different nature than the
right to travel, not only is it not a ‘privilege or immunity’ of citizenship, but it
is also mentioned and handled by section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
255. This American Life: Reap What You Sow, Chicago Public Radio
(Jan.
27,
2012),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/456/transcript.
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migration and runs afoul of the right to travel?
A.

Deciding when Discrimination Affects Migration

The question of when and how a state law violates the
right to travel has been a puzzle throughout the right’s long
history.256 However, the Supreme Court has provided some
useful guidance. The right to travel can be infringed upon in
three ways: the first is a “direct obstruction” to ingress and
egress, this has included criminalization, and direct taxation of
people traveling into the state. The second and third method is
the use of discrimination against travelers and new residents of
a state. Direct obstruction on the ability or forced exit does not
require much additional analysis. However the use of
discriminating treatment to control travel and migration does.
States may not treat travelers differently because they are not
residents, and may not discriminate against “new” residents for
being new.257 A right to travel that ignores discrimination
would be neutered as states could control migration by
disparate treatment. The Supreme Court has provided
guidance on to determine when a state controls migration by
using discrimination
States cannot create conditions based on disparate
treatment that would drive a population out or prevent certain
groups from entering. And yet, individuals or groups may
decide to move into states or leave states for a host of reasons
and states are not forced to take into every possible incentive.
Taxation provides an obvious example. States are not required
to homogenize their taxation schemes even though many
people can base their decisions to live or leave a state based on
taxation.258 Nevertheless the Supreme Court has not shied
away from striking down unequal treatment that has the
256. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 499, 501-504 (1999).
257. Article IV purports to protect travelers while the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause protects residents.
258. Paul L. Caron, Did Taxes Help Drive Dwight Howard to Sign with
the Houston Rockets Rather Than the L.A. Lakers?, TAXPROF BLOG (Jul. 6,
2013),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/07/did-taxes.html;
though some limitations on taxation may exist; see David Schmudde,
Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Nonresident Citizens, 1999
L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 95, 95-167 (1999).
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potential to exclude people.
Prior to Saenz, state legislators were often explicit in their
desires to affect migration policy. In Shapiro, the states
admitted that they intended to prevent poor people from
migrating into their states for welfare benefits. In Maricopa,
Arizona explicitly declared their intention to prevent people
from moving in to use free medical services. When state
legislators made public their intentions to prevent migration, it
was easy for the Court to declare such intentions as
unconstitutional, even if they would serve a legitimate purpose
such as preventing financial ruin of a program.259 Just as with
other Equal Protection claims, a clear animus, or in this
situation a clear purpose to drive people out of the state, would
violate the right to travel.260
When states and legislators are less clear on their
intentions, the Court must examine the conditions imposed by
state legislators. In striking down the denial of welfare benefits
in Shapiro and free medical care in Maricopa-the Court
couched these benefits as “vital” or as a “basic necessity of
life.”261 When compared to residency for tuition at colleges, the
Court stated that “higher tuition fees to nonresident students
cannot be equated with granting of basic subsistence.”262 The
Court was attempting to balance the level of harm imposed by
the state.263 It is not surprising that courts in Maricopa and
Shapiro both found that the denial of “basic necessities of life”
to be coercive and penalizing people for choosing to migrate.
Imposing conditions that are reasonably calculated to force
migration should be considered a difficult standard to meet
259. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
260. The animus test from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) should apply be applied to the right to travel
context.
261. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974).
262. Id. at 260 quoting Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238
(Minn. 1970)) (the court could be forgiven for some hyperbole for denial of
benefits that would result in death may be protected by substantive due
process and not require the right to travel).
263. Zobel would seem to create a stark contrast, but the majority
refused to see the case as one of the right to travel, and the concurring
opinion by Justice Brennan recognized that it would have little effect on
migration. Only Justice O’Connor’s concurrence framed the issue squarely
under a right to travel.
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under normal circumstances. A higher tax burden, or more
onerous licensing requirements are unlikely to meet this
hurdle. Even restrictions on where to live, as long as
alternatives are plentiful, may not trigger strict scrutiny.
Nevertheless a denial of essential benefits, which need not
themselves be constitutionally mandated, does trigger scrutiny
under a right to travel analysis.
B.

Self-Deportation Laws as Impermissible Burdens on the
Right to Travel

State self-deportation laws run afoul of the right to travel
under three circumstances. The first is the purpose and intent
of the law was to affect the migration of people into and out the
state or municipality. Despite having clear borders, states have
no legitimate interest in protecting their borders against
people. The second method is for states to directly obstruct the
entry of non-citizens into their territory or directly force them
out. This can be accomplished with taxes, though most state
self-deportation laws avoid the taxation issue and go straight
to criminalizing people for their presence. The final method for
a self-deportation law to violate the right to travel, would be to
deny essential key services or benefits to non-citizens such that
they would be dissuaded from entering or forced to leave.264
The state legislatures that passed self-deportation laws
such as HB 56, SB1070, or the municipalities that passed the
ordinances in Farmers Branch and the City of Hazelton were
initially not shy about their intentions to force migration out of
264. Professor Delaney in proposing a Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis essentially reaches a similar conclusion by noting that, “A Dormant
Commerce Clause–type approach would require an expansion of this
principle to regulations affecting access to other basic goods—such as
housing, education, or health care—the denial of which threatens an
immigrant’s ability to survive as a new resident. Preventing aliens from
accessing these types of goods can be considered tantamount to denying them
entrance, thus violating the national interest in a uniform system of
immigration.” Delaney, at 1845 supra note 134. This is unsurprising given
the intertwined nature of the right to travel and the Dormant Commerce
clause. However, it should be noted that the “effects” test proposed by
Professor Delaney, would not work, as the Court struck down a similar
attempt under the right to travel calling it an “actual deterrence”
requirement. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504.
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their area. Scott Beason openly declared that HB 56 was
designed to “fix” the undocumented problem, and to do so by
driving them out of the state. But just as California eventually
stopped referring to their attempt to change welfare benefits as
a migration tool, the authors of self-deportation laws may also
stop publicly declaring their intentions to drive the
undocumented out. In which case, relying on legislative intent
or purpose to analyze state deportation laws may not prove
fruitful.
The “self-deportation” laws operate on several different
levels. The laws criminalize the presence of undocumented
migrants, usually in the form of requiring documentation to
prove lawful status. The laws criminalize activities that are
essential to residence; such as employment and the renting of
an abode. Finally, the laws also discourage or invalidate
interactions that undocumented have with other residents of
the state, for instance preventing the transportation or
harboring of undocumented migrants and the voiding of
contracts entered into with the undocumented.
Laws, such as SB 1070 that criminalize the mere presence
of the undocumented are a clear example of a direct migration
control. Threatening a person with loss of liberty for the mere
act of entering into the territory is the hallmark of state action
forbidden by the right to travel. In fact, other than the Missouri
Constitution of 1820, no state has attempted to test the right to
travel in this manner.
Laws that restrict certain activities, such as employment
and rent present a more difficult challenge. Employment
restrictions have been difficult to analyze using the preemption and equal protection analysis, and prove to be no
easier when placed against the right to travel.265 However,
preventing a person from seeking any employment could be
interpreted as forcing a person to leave the state. While the
denial of employment for specific jobs for non-citizens may not
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause directly,266 the
265. Compare DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), with Traux v.
Rauch, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
266. Compare Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (denying noncitizens employment as public teachers upheld), with Application of Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973) (forbidding the exclusion of non-citizens from being
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Supreme Court has found that denying employment on a
blanket basis can run afoul of the right to travel.267 While the
denial of specific jobs or specific licensing requirements would
not be enough to compel the expulsion of the undocumented, a
universal ban on all types of employment is coercive enough to
violate the right to travel.268
Similarly, ordinances that prevent the undocumented from
renting an apartment also run afoul of the right to travel.
Forcing the choice to either become homeless or break the law
would drive reasonable people to leave the state or
municipality. Federal courts have described such choices as
forcing people to leave the area. In the Hazleton case, the Third
Circuit in examining Hazelton’s rental restrictions noted, “[I]t
is difficult to conceive of a more effective method of ensuring
that persons do not enter or remain in a locality than by
precluding their ability to live in it.”269 In the en banc decision
by the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch, the Court similarly
described the rental ordinances as creating circumstances such
that, “because no alien with an unlawful status will be able to
obtain the basic need of shelter through a rental contract.
Illegal aliens will therefore have no recourse but to self-deport
from Farmers Branch.”270 Compare the decision in Maricopa
County that forbade Arizona from withholding “a basic
necessity of life,” with the Farmers Branch decision that the
rental ordinance “precludes aliens from obtaining an essential
human requirement.”271 The perspective that rental contracts
are necessary for the basic requirement of shelter may also go a
long way to explain why land ownership can be denied to nonlawyers).
267. Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (striking
down an employment classification for veterans who served while a resident
of New York versus another state).
268. Once again this does not prevent a federal scheme that would
prevent employment. An open question would remain as to whether federal
authorization could allow states to adopt policies that prevent the
employment of the undocumented. For instance a federal mandatory E-Verify
program would require additional analysis.
269. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 220-21 ( 3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft Boats, 489 US. 141, 160 (1989)).
270. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d
524, 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (Reavley, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 541.
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citizens while rental restrictions cannot apply to the
undocumented.272
While the renters’ and employment provisions have gotten
judicial scrutiny in a variety of courts, the provisions that test
basic social and economic interactions has only been tested in a
lawsuit challenging Alabama’s HB 56.273 HB 56 went a step
further than the previous self-deportation laws by voiding
contracts entered into by the undocumented and by eliminating
governmental services. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down these provisions citing pre-emption, but did so by
describing them as “extraordinary and unprecedented would be
an understatement, as it imposes a statutory disability
typically reserved for those who are so incapable as to render
their contracts void or voidable. Essentially, the ability to
maintain even a minimal existence is no longer an option for
unlawfully present aliens in Alabama.”274 If Alabama could
void all contracts entered with undocumented migrants, it
would effectively shut down their ability to conduct basic
economic activities.
Self-deportation laws also criminalize normal social
interactions with the undocumented. While federal law has
anti-harboring statutes that prevent people from concealing or
transporting undocumented migrants, courts have limited
criminal liability for conduct that “substantially facilitates” an
undocumented person remaining.275 State laws that criminalize
the transportation or harboring of the undocumented have no
such requirement and punish conduct that could include
inviting an undocumented migrant for dinner, or carpooling
with one to work. These laws reach into normal social
interactions and punish any contact with the undocumented.
Most courts have struck down these provisions after comparing
them to the federal analogues and finding them an “untenable
expansion.”276 Just as the contractual provision of HB 56
attempts to cut off economic interactions of the undocumented,
272. This may answer the conundrum posed by Tirres, supra note 249.
273. ALA. CODE § 31-13-1 (1975).
274. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012).
275. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d
524, 576 n.20 (5th Cir. 2013) (Reavley, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 531 n.9.
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the expansion of transportation or harboring provisions
attempt to cut off all social interactions. Under both scenarios,
they would render it nearly impossible for the undocumented to
function in society and therefore force them out of the
municipality or state.
If instead of employing pre-emption, the Farmers Branch¸
Fremont¸ and Alabama courts had instead employed the right
to travel, much of the analysis would remain intact. All three
courts would have examined the state self-deportation laws
and ruled that their purposes and results if enacted would
drive the undocumented out of the state or municipality. The
difference in employing a right to travel lens would be such a
conclusion would be determinative, any additional conjecture of
this effect on national immigration policy would be
unnecessary.
The decisions in Plyler and Arizona could have similarly
been simplified. Texas’s discrimination against undocumented
children could have been struck down as an attempt to
withhold an essential benefit that unconstitutionally burdened
the right to travel, just as the denial of free emergency room
services in Maricopa or welfare benefits in Shapiro. SB 1070’s
attempt to drive the undocumented from Arizona and create
their own state migration policy could have been ruled as a
threat to comity between the states, federal power and most
importantly a violation of a fundamental right that has been
protected since before the Constitution.
Conclusion
Justice Brandeis famously declared, “It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” 277 Implicit in Brandeis’ vision of state sovereignty are
two assumptions, that such experimentations do not imperil
the rest of the country and that people have the freedom to
decide which states they may choose to become a member of.
277. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1982)
(dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis).
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Self-deportation laws violate both assumptions of Justice
Brandeis’ vision for state sovereignty.
Controlling the migration of people is an awesome power,
one that implicates both individual freedom and national
sovereignty. Nations and sovereignties may employ a variety of
means to control migration and membership. The federal
government may create incentives for entry on the national
level. At the same time, the federal government wields the
awesome power of deportation, a power that can separate
families, deny people their freedom and liberty and even
interfere with basic constitutional and human rights if wielded
fairly. States however only have the power to entice entry.278
They do not have any power to drive or deny entry into their
borders.279
The right to travel restriction against state control of
migration confirms Professor Motomura’s vision of a federal
project to create membership and identity. Undocumented
immigrants are undocumented because the federal government
has either chosen to exclude them, but failed to remove them,
or the government has not had a chance to decide the matter
because of deception or evasion by the migrants themselves.
But when the federal government fails to act, states and
municipalities do not have room to exercise their judgment.
Michael Walzer advocated that a strong national border is
necessary to prevent the creation of a “thousand petty
fortresses”280 but it is the right to travel that prevents states
and municipalities from building walls and gates to those
278. Zobel 457 U.S. at 67-68 (concurring opinion by Justice Brennan)
(“A State clearly may undertake to enhance the advantages of industry,
economy, and resources that make it a desirable place in which to live. In
addition, a State may make residence within its boundaries more attractive
by offering direct benefits to its citizens in the form of public services, lower
taxes than other States offer, or direct distributions of its munificence.
Through these means, one State may attract citizens of other States to join
the numbers of its citizenry.”)
279. The one-sided nature of the right to travel; restricting states from
denying entry or forcing exit but allowing them to encourage migration
affords it an advantage over pre-emption analysis. While states that
encourage protection of the undocumented may suffer under a preemption
analysis, not such infirmary would occur under the right to travel framework.
280. The term was coined in, Michael Walzer, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 39 (1983), to describe the dangers of
not having a strong national border.

79

2014]

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

893

searching for a home, or a place of sanctuary.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7

80

